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The School of Business Administration through its Bureau of Business and Economic
,ifS! . ,S VGry Pmud and esPecial,y Phased to present this "proceedings"issue of
Montana Business Quarterly. Most of this issue comes from presentations made
in the Montana s Economic Outlook" seminars conducted in four Montana cities 
in January.
A genesis
Bureau m l u ' ° } T 'W??mething of the seminars and their genesis. In 1970-71, the 
analvsis of the f t  > 6 Moniana Economic Study, a thorough investigation and 
suDDorted hv feHe I ec?nomy conducted over a two-year period and financially 
Z r e  and State fu"ds‘ Maior findi"gs including some projections of
Decemberwo'A *  3 ° " e-day confere"ce held in Great Falls in
because of !!nuth!noSS ,h! nrarm  recept.on was given to some of the findings-not 
were not nonular- tU *  ^v|d l°  • e study s approach but because the conclusions
state's^ccmomv anH d,d n0t P? dict̂  as many hoPed' a bright rosy future for thestate s economy and the course of its development
the DasysSaeeSeao? [ X t ! ? " 5 8row,s‘ale a"d are ™de obsolete and of limited use with 
loJ economIZ  Ik 15' C°upled Wlth mouming concerns about the seemingly 
de^loomenTs and a v  *he. state' P™mPted a review of economic trends. 
Bureau O f Susinr« “ 2 c ° " S ln. 1974' The ^view was undertaken jointly by the 
Economics and Frnn r Z ™  Research and the Department of Agricultural 
Th“ L lu d l  I P  a* Mon,ana S*a,e Universi,y at the request of Governor 
1975 The reDcfrt eenerat c°nomic Report to the Governor was delivered in January
recoVer^f s°enemtCH°n0miv d0WntUrn ° f 1974 continued into 1975 with only limited 
devdo^m^KP ^ US *° reexamine ‘he Montana economy and report 
Thus theirn^do^mam H ou,look ‘°  larger interested audiences.
Wldely rec° 8nized need to provide better and 
to present a ser es of f ™ Montana s economy led to the Bureau's commitment 
presem a ser,es of Economic Outlook seminars.
The seminars
councils X s X a r T P t ^  '°Cal chambe‘s ° f commerce, trades and labor 
Great M l! Bureau presented one-day seminars in Billings,
each citv and M,?soula-The two morning presentations were repeated in
each city, and these constitute the first two articles of this issue In Mis^ula the
,hesx : as, der er to ,he w° ° d produ« s
developments The i X r ^ c X T h "  SeSS'° n * W'th Mon,ana coal and energy --------- L  s- me last art,cle In this issue of the Montana Business Quarterly
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contains an analysis of coal gasification by Richard Stroup and Walter Thurman of 
Montana State University, Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics. 
Some of the afternoon presentation was based on this article. Because the bulk of 
the material presented by Paul Polzin at the afternoon sessions dealing with 
Montana coal and energy questions was published in the Autumn 1974 issue of the 
Quarterly under the title, "W ater Use and Coal Development in Eastern Montana, 
it is not included here.
O f special attraction were the luncheon speakers. In Billings, Great Falls, and 
Missoula, Samuel B. Chase, Jr., former University of Montana faculty member and 
now a consulting economist in Washington, D.C., spoke on "O u r Strained Financial 
System." Chase also served as an advisor to the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Duane W. ("Doc") Bowler, editorial page editor of the Billings 
Gazette, spoke of "An Outsider's View of State Government" at the Helena seminar.
In praise and gratitude
For myself the seminars were a rewarding, but demanding, experience. The 
assistance provided by the several sponsors was exceeded only by the warm and 
thoughtful reception and responses at the seminars. To all who helped, our deep 
gratitude. Our luncheon speakers performed admirably—and injected a welcome 
and less intensely focused element to the programs. Special praise must go to the 
Bureau staffers: Maxine Johnson, Director, and Paul Polzin, Research
Associate—both of whom have faculty appointments in the School's Department of 
Management—gave their usual outstanding and effective performances. Joyce 
Zacek, Editor, did yeoman service in planning and making all the local 
arrangements. Thanks to her careful attention and thoroughness the seminars came 
off well. Joyce deserves our gratitude and a special tribute. Maybe we II do it again 
next year.
Rudyard B. Goode 
Dean
School of Business Administration
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MONTANA’S  ECONOMY
where it’s been 
and where it’s going
lA /hat we are most interested in, of course, is 
where Montana's economy is going. But in order to 
predict where we may be going in Montana, we 
have to understand where we are now and how we 
got there.
So I shall spend a few minutes talking about the 
past—about what happened to the Montana 
economy between 1950 and 1970 and then about 
what seems to have been happening since 1970.
I break the discussion into these two time periods 
or a reason: We have very good information for 
the period 1950 to 1970, because we have census 
figures for 1950, 1960, and 1970. We have 
confidence in their accuracy and in our 
interpretation of the Montana economy during the 
fifties and sixties.
But in 1975 we are in an awkward position, 
halfway between the 1970 and 1980 census. The 
information we have isn't so good and we're not so 
sure how to interpret it. Because of this I'll spend 
more time talking about what appears to us to be 
con icting evidence about recent economic 
developments in’Montana.
THen we'll discuss more recent history—the
. , "" recession and how it has affected Montana.
n we II do a little speculating about what 1976 
may bring.
MAXINE C. JOHNSON
Maxine C. Johnson is 
Director o f the Bureau of 
Business and Economic 
Research and Professor of 
Management in the School 
of Business Administra 
tion at the University of 
Montana, Missoula.
Is the state economy 
turning the corner? 
Well, maybe
6
Let's go back in history and look at Montana dur 
ing the fifties and sixties. Montana's economy 
performed rather poorly during those decades. 
There weren't enough jobs to go around and 
incomes fell behind national averages. As a result, a 
good many Montanans went looking for 
opportunity elsewhere. Here's what happened to 














Montana's population grew much more slowly 
than the U.S. population because of heavy 
outmigration. During the sixties 58,000 more 
people moved out of Montana than moved in. 
That's the “net migration" figure there on the 
bottom line. In the 1950s, 25,000 more had moved 
out than in. Now, people move for many reasons, 
but we think most of these people left to look for 
greater economic opportunities.
One of the reasons why we think this is so is 
because of the slow growth of employment during 
the fifties and sixties. Figure 1 shows how much 
more slowly employment grew in Montana than in 
the United States between 1957 and 1970. (We 
begin with 1957 because that is the earliest year for 
which we have annual figures for Montana.) We 
can see how the gap widened during the late 
sixties, as U.S. employment grew much more 
rapidly.
It isn't surprising, then, that unemployment in 
Montana was quite high (figure 2). Throughout this 
period ft generally was higher in Montana than in 
the United States. Towards the end of the sixties, 
the spread became larger.
So we had a slow growth of employment, and we 
had unemployment generally higher than in the 
United States as a whole. It's no surprise, then, that 
incomes grew slowly. Figure 3 shows per capita 
income in Montana and the United States from
’Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census o f Population, 1950, 
1960, and 1970.
Figure 1
Employment in Montana and the 
United States, 1957-1970
Ratio scale.
Sources: Montana Department o f Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division and U.S. Department of 
Labor.
Figure 2
Unemployment in Montana and the 
United States, 1957-1970
Percent of Labor Force Montana
Sources: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division and U.S. Department of 
Labor.
Figure 3
Per Capita Income in Montana and the 
United States, 1950-1970
1967 dollars. Ratio scale.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.
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1950 to 1970. Per capita income is total income 
divided by total population—in other words, 
average income per person. It includes not only 
wages and salaries but proprietors' income, 
property income, welfare payments—any kind of 
income that individuals receive. The figures are in 
1967 dollars, that is, they have been adjusted for 
changes in purchasing power.
In 1950, Montana's per capita income was higher 
than that for the United States—about 8 percent 
higher. In about the mid-fifties, it fell below the 
U.S. figure, and it's been lower ever since. In 1970, 
Montana's per capita income was 12 percent below 
the national average.
"Many Montanans went 
looking for opportunity 
elsewhere during 
the fifties and sixties”
Now there are several things to say about these 
income figures. First, per capita income did 
increase in Montana— it was 34 percent higher in 
1970 than in 1950 after adjustment for price 
changes, and this is a significant increase. But for 
the country as a whole, the gain amounted to 64 
percent. Montanans were not sharing in the 
national prosperity to the same extent as most 
other Americans.
Second, we use per capita income as an indicator 
of economic well-being because it's the best 
comparison we have. We know that Montanans 
enjoy many benefits that cannot be expressed in 
dollars, and we also know that human welfare does 
not depend on income or material well-being 
alone.
Third, since per capita figures are averages, they 
hide some very great differences in individual 
incomes. We have some people with very high 
incomes in Montana and some with very low 
incomes. The proportion in each of these groups is 
somewhat smaller here than in the United States.
And, finally, if you're wondering why Montana's 
per capita income jumps around so much more 
than the U.S. figure, the answer is agriculture. In 
almost every case, the big ups and downs in 
Montana income are related to agriculture. In 1954, 
1959,1961, and 1964, farm incomes were down and 
so was per capita income in the state. The years 
when per capita income was high generally were 
prosperous years for agriculture.
So by national standards and in terms of jobs and 
income, Montana's economy performed rather
poorly during the fifties and sixties. Let's look at the 
reasons why.
Mostly it was because of the makeup of 
Montana's industrial base. In studying regional 
economies, economists often divide industries into 
two groups. One group consists of primary or basic 
industries—those that produce goods and services 
for sale outside the region. Primary industries are 
thought to provide the basis for growth. The other 
group we call derivative industries—those that 
mostly serve the local population. Changes in 
derivative industries usually can be related to 
changes in primary industries.
Montana's primary or basic industries are 




Total 103,300 85,100 -18,200
Farm 52,800 36,100 -16,700
Nonfarm 50,500 49,000 - 1,500
Mining 10,200 6,600 - 3,600
Manufacturing 18,000 23,900 5,900
Railroads 14,000 6,600 - 7,400
Federal government 8,300 11,900 3,600
If you wonder why railroads are considered as a 
basic industry, it's because they haul a lot of goods 
across the state for out-of-state businesses. Federal 
employees manage the federal lands not just for 
Montanans but for all Americans, and decisions 
affecting employment are made outside the state.
In almost every case, the big ups 
and downs in Montana income are 
related to agriculture"
Between 1950 and 1970, we lost over 18,000 jobs in 
these primary industries. Agriculture, of course, 
was the big loser—16,700 workers—as farms grew 
larger and more mechanized. Mining lost 3,600 
jobs mostly because of the switch from  
underground to open pit mining. Railroads cut 
their employment by over 7,000 as they changed 
from steam-powered to diesel engines, and as they 
automated their switchyards. Only manufacturing 
and the federal government employed more 
people in 1970 than in 1950.
2Source: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 
employment Security Division.
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Montana's experience in losing jobs in 
agriculture, mining, and railroads was not unique. 
It was happening all over the United States. Our 
problem was that those industries were more 
important here than in the country as a whole. We 
had too many eggs in the wrong baskets.
So, we had a net loss of 18,000 jobs in our primary 
industries over the two decades, mostly because of 
new production methods and new technology 
which increased productivity and reduced the 
need for workers in agriculture, mining, and 
railroads. Now, primary industries generally are the 
industries where pay scales are the highest, and that 
was the case here. Montana lost a lot of good jobs
"Between 1950 and 1970 we lost 
over 18,000 jobs in 
primary industries"
during the fifties and sixties. We don't always think 
of agriculture as a high income activity, but the 
average income per agricultural worker (including 
proprietors) in Montana is nearly always higher 
than the average for nonfarm workers (including 
the self-employed).
The industries that increased their employment 
and kept total employment growing (although not 
very fast) were the derivative industries—those 
industries which mostly serve the local population.3









railroads) 7,900 10,800 2,900
Construction 10,500 11,000 500
Trade 36,700 48,100 11,400
Services and
finance 23,400 41,800 18,400
State and local
government 20,000 40,700 20,700
All other 26,700 28,200 1,500
Those industries are the utilities (except railroads), 
construction, wholesale and retail trade, services 
and finance, and state and local government. The 
“all other" consists mostly of self-employed people 
in nonfarm industries, especially construction, 
retail trade, and services. The big gainers were 
trade, services and finance, and state and local 
government. As you know, these industries also 
were growing nationally. As people grow more
Mbid,
affluent they demand more goods and service, 
both public and private. And because these are 
industries where productivity increases quite 
slowly, employment expands to fill the increased 
need.
Mostly because of the growth in trade, services, 
and government, total employment in Montana 
was higher in 1970 than in 1950:4
Total Employment, M ontana
1950 1970 Change
Total 228,500 265,700 37,200
Primary
industries 103,300 85,100 -18,200
Derivative
industries 125,200 180,600 55,400
Women workers accounted for all of the increased 
employment; the number of men employed in the 
state actually declined between 1950 and 1970.
This shift in employment from primary to 
derivative industries goes a long way toward 
explaining why Montana's per capita income grew 
so slowly. What we did was replace jobs in 
Montana's primary industries (which paid an 
average of $9,600 per year back in 1970) with jobs in 
derivative industries (where the average worker 
earned less than $6,000 in 1970).
Another reason Montana's per capita income fell 
below the national average was that a smaller 
proportion of our population was in the labor 
force. Most of those people who left the state were 
in the working age groups, so the state's population 
was heavily weighted with children and older 
people. And although Montana women were 
going to work in increasing numbers during this 
period, the percentage of working women was 
smaller here than in the United States as a whole.
4lbid.
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As the seventies began, then, Montana's 
economy was not in very good shape. The past 
twenty, and especially the last ten years—the 
sixties—had been a period of falling behind, and 
our prospects for the seventies didn't seem much 
better.
But now, halfway through the decade, there is 
some indication that things are changing, that they 
are getting better. According to the figures we 
have, population and employment are increasing 
more rapidly in Montana than in the United States. 
Our incomes compare a little better with the 
national figure.
"We had more new jobs 
in Montana between 1970 and 1974 
than we had in the twenty years 
from 1950 to 1970j/
Figure 4 compares population and employment 
changes in Montana and the United States between 
1970 and 1974. Keep in mind that Montana really 
didn't feel the recession much until late in 1974, so 
we're comparing a pretty good year in Montana 
with a recession year nationally. It may make us 
look better than we deserve. The Census Bureau 
reports that population increased 6 percent in 
Montana and 4 percent in the United States 
between 1970 and 1974. The Employment Security 
Division, Montana Department of Labor, and the 
U.S. Department of Labor estimate employment 
increases of 14 percent in Montana and 8 percent in 
the United States. We had more new jobs in 
Montana between 1970 and 1974 than we had in the 
twenty years from 1950 to 1970.
Even so, unemployment stayed higher than in 
the United States, running about 6 percent most of 
the time, and getting up close to 7 percent in 1974 
(figure 5).
Per capita income grew a little faster in Montana 
(figure 6). In 1974 it was only 9 percent below the 
national figure, compared to 12 percent below in 
1970. The large increases in Montana's per capita 
income in 1972 and 1973 were the result of big gains 
in farm income.
We don't think there's any doubt that Montana 
did better in the early seventies than it did in the 
sixties. But we think some of these figures ought 
not to be taken at their face value. So let's take a 
closer look at what happened between 1970 and 
1974.
There are two reasons why Montana's economy 
turned in a better performance. One reason is high
Figure 4





Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of 
Labor, and Montana Department o f Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division.
Figure 5
Unemployment in Montana and the 
United States, 1970-1974
Percent o f 
Labor Force
Sources: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division and U.S. Department of 
Labor.
Figure 6
Per Capita Income in Montana and the 
United States, 1970-1974
1967 dollars. Ratio scale.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
tconomic Analysis.
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farm income and the other is an apparent increase 
in primary employment.
The single biggest influence on the state as a 
whole was farm income. It began to increase in 
1972; in 1973, after adjustment for changes in price 
levels, it was almost double the postwar average. It 
declined in 1974, but still was very high. This new 
found prosperity of farmers and ranchers gave the 
state quite a boost and certainly contributed to 
employment and income in Montana towns 
serving agricultural areas.
Montana's other primary industries also 
contributed to the improved record. Here are 
employment figures for 1970 and 1974.5
Primary Employment, M ontana
1970 1974 Change
Total 85,100 86,400 1,300
Farm 36,100 35,100 -1,000
Nonfarm 49,000 51,300 2,300
Mining 6,600 7,500 900
Manufacturing 23,900 24,300 400
Railroads 6,600 6,500 - 100
Federal government 11,900 13,000 1,100
Remember that between 1950 and 1970 primary 
employment in Montana declined by about 18,000, 
and that that decline was the major reason for 
Montana's poor economic performance during the 
fifties and sixties. Since 1970 primary employment 
may have begun to grow. I say “may" for several 
reasons. One is that the 1974 figures are estimates. 
They are pretty good estimates, but there are 
possibilities for error—especially in agricultural 
employment, which is very difficult to measure.
The figures for nonfarm primary employment are 
much more reliable. Most of the new nonfarm jobs 
were provided by mining and the federal 
government. If we look more closely at mining 
employment, we see that 400 of the new workers 
were coal miners in eastern Montana. Another 400
new jobs opened up in petroleum and gas
production and non -metallic mining:6
1970 1974 Change
Mining 6,600 7,500 900
Metal mining 4,000 4,100 100
Coal mining 100 500 400
Other 2,500 2,900 400
Manufacturing 23,900 24,300 400
Food products 4,300 4,100 - 200
Wood products 8,200 9,300 1,100
Primary metals 4,700 3,400 -1,300
Other 6,700 7,500 800
Mbid.
‘•Ibid.
I don't think the increase in manufacturing 
employment really amounted to 400 workers. The 
year 1970 was a very poor one for the lumber 
industry and employment was way down. In 1974, 
in spite of some shutdowns late in the year, average 
employment was quite high. So the 1,100 increase 
in employment in wood products between 1970 
and 1974 exaggerates the actual growth. We think 
the number of new jobs was really around 
800—That is what the increase was between 1960 
and 1973, both pretty good years for the forest 
industries. If wood products only provided 800 new 
jobs, that almost wipes out the overall gain in 
manufacturing employment.
That big decline in primary metals was the result 
of the closing of the Great Falls smelter and 
declines at other locations during 1972 and 1973, 
not a reflection of the recession. The 800 new 
workers in other manufacturing included small 
increases in a number of activities— among them 
chemicals, cement, and travel trailers.
Those high farm incomes and the stability of 
nonfarm basic employment had a startling effect on 
derivative employment: almost 35,000 new
jobs—an increase of 19 percent—in four years:7
Derivative Employment, M ontana
1970 1974 Change
Total 180,600 215,300 34,700
Utilities (except
railroads) 10,800 13,100 2,300
Construction 11,000 13,800 2,800
Trade 48,100 59,100 11,000
Services and 
finance 41,800 53,400 11,600
State and local 
government 40,700 45,200 4,500
All other 28,200 30,700 2,500
Two-thirds of the gain (almost 23,000 jobs) was in 
trade, services, and finance. Of these, about 6,000 
were in motels, restaurants, and bars. You may have 
noticed that Colonel Sanders, McDonald's, and 
Sambo's all discovered Montana in the early 
seventies.
We think these employment figures are a little 
misleading. First of all, although the number of jobs 
has been increasing, the average hours worked per 
week has been declining significantly. This is 
especially true in the trade and service industries. If 
workers in those industries had been working the 
same number of hours on the average in 1974 that 
they were in 1970, there would have been almost 
5,400 fewer workers. That would have meant only a
7lbid.
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little over 29,000 new derivative jobs rather than the 
34,700 reported here. This is not happening 
nationwide; at the national level, there has been a 
slight decline in number of hours worked, but 
nothing like the decline in Montana.
So while we have a lot of new jobs in the state, a 
good many of them seem to be part-time 
jobs—jobs as waitresses, motel maids, and so forth.
There's another way of looking at the 
relationship between primary and derivative 
industries, and that is to look at the earnings of 
workers in each group of industries:* 68
Total Earnings, Montana 
(Millions of 1967 Dollars)
1970 1974
Primary workers 709 817
Derivative workers 916 1,092
Ratio, derivative
to primary 1.3 1.3
These figures represent total earnings—wages and 
salaries plus income of the self-employed—in 
primary industries and derivative industries. The 
interesting thing is that even though the number of 
derivative workers grew much more rapidly 
between 1970 and 1974 than did the number of 
primary workers, the relationship between the 
total earnings of the two groups stayed the same. 
That is, in both years, total earnings of workers in 
derivative industries were equal to about 1.3 times 
the earnings of primary workers.
In other words, the income multiplier effect of 
Montana's primary or basic industries has stayed 
just about the same even though the income 
generated is being divided among many more 
derivative workers. Obviously, this means a slower 
growth in income per derivative worker, and that's 
exactly what has happened.
Between 1970 and 1974, average earnings per 
year-round primary worker went up 15 percent in 
constant, 1967 dollars, while the average for 
derivative workers actually declined 1 percent after 
adjustment for price changes:9






workers $8,235 $9,480 15
Derivative
workers 5,118 5,072 - 1
#U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
’Derived from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and Montana Department of Labor and 
Industry. Employment Security Division data.
So what did happen in Montana between 1970 
and 1974? Certainly we had a better record than we 
did in the fifties and sixties. Employment increased 
rapidly, mostly because farm income was high and 
nonfarm primary industries appeared to hold their 
own or even grow a little. We should recognize, 
however, that the increase in total employment 
may not be all it appears to be: a good share of the 
increase appears to represent more workers 
working fewer hours in jobs that don't pay very 
well.
Our per capita income moved closer to the 
national average, but the gains were due in part to 
high farm income, and farm income is very 
unreliable. A poor crop year in Montana or a price 
decline could wipe out those gains. We note also 
that the state's unemployment rate continued 
higher than the United States over the whole 
period. And finally, in spite of all the talk about 
population growth, we doubt that Montana's 
population really increased by 6 percent in four 
years. It's nothing unusual for the Census Bureau to 
overestimate Montana's population between 
census years. They did so in the fifties and the 
sixties.
While we have a lot of new jobs, 
many seem to be part-time 
and low-paying
We know that the proportion of Montana's 
population in the labor force has been growing 
rather rapidly because of all the young people born 
during the baby boom of the fifties who are now of 
working age, and because of the increasing 
numbers of women who are working. These 
increases in employment may have misled the 
Census Bureau: one of the data series it uses in 
making its yearly population estimates is nonfarm 
wage and salary workers.
If the population figure is too high, then of 
course that means that the per capita income 
estimates are too low, because per capita income is 
calculated by dividing total income by total 
population. So maybe Montana really didn't have a
6 percent increase in population between 1970 and
1974, and maybe our per capita and family incomes
were a little higher than the figures show. 
Unfortunately, we probably won't know whether 
this theory is true until after the 1980 census. But it
is an interpretation of recent events that has quite a 
lot of appeal. A good many Montanans would just
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as soon population didn't grow, but most of us 
would like to see our incomes moving toward the 
national average.
There is one more thing we need to say about 
Montana between 1970 and 1974. The growth in 
population and employment which did occur 
wasn't spread evenly around the state. And we 
have a new candidate for the title '"fastest growing 
city," replacing Missoula: Billings. Just over one- 
fourth of the new jobs created between 1970 and 
1974 were in Yellowstone County. Another one- 
fourth were in the Bozeman and Missoula labor 
market areas. That is, together the two areas 
accounted for 25 percent.
The Bozeman area, as defined by the Montana 
Department of Labor, includes Gallatin, Meagher, 
and Park counties. The Missoula area includes 
Sanders, Mineral, Missoula, and Ravalli counties. I 
think it is safe to assume that most of the jobs were 
in Bozeman and Missoula.
These three areas, whose economies generated 
more than half the new jobs between 1970 and 
1974, had only 31 percent of the state's population 
in 1970. Cascade County had a very respectable 
growth; it accounted for 8 percent of the new jobs 
during the four-year period. The Helena area, 
which includes Lewis and Clark, Broadwater, and 
Jefferson counties, accounted for 6 percent.
I've talked about the period from 1970 to 1974 
because I wanted to discuss possible long-term 
changes in the direction of Montana's economy 
since 1970. But during the past two years we've had 
another influence to contend with—a national 
recession which has been the worst since the
thirties. Montana, of course, is affected by national 
economic developments. We know that very well 
in western Montana, where changes in the national 
housing market have a great deal to do with our 
economic health, dependent as it is upon the wood 
products industry.
" Montana as a whole is not as 
susceptible to business cycles as are 
many other parts of the 
United States"
But Montana as a whole is not as susceptible to 
business cycles as are many other parts of the 
United States. A 1973 report by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce compared changes in 
nonfarm income in the fifty states during five post- 
World War II recessions. The authors found that 
Montana was one of the least cyclical of the states. 
Only two—North and South Dakota—showed 
more resistance to national business cycles.
The explanation is rather obvious—the states that 
suffer most during recession are those that are 
heavily dependent on manufacturing, especially 
durable goods manufacturing (automobiles, ap 
pliances, etc.).
Most of Montana, of course, still is pre 
dominately agricultural. Only western Montana is 
dependent upon manufacturing activity for a large 
part of its income. Even though it has been 
declining in importance for twenty-five years, 
agriculture still has more influence on Montana's 
total personal income than does any other activity.
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The events of the past two years confirm this. 
High farm income in 1974, plus the lack of 
manufacturing activity in the state as a whole, kept 
Montana from feeling the recession the way many 
industrial areas did. We did not experience the 
decline in employment that occurred in the United 
States as a whole (figure 7).
In 1975, unemployment in the United States 
exceeded unemployment in Montana for the first 
time in twenty years or so—further evidence that 
the recession was less severe here (figure 8). Just the 
same, Montana's unemployment rate rose and 
hovered around 8 percent for most of 1975, and 
that is high enough.
Figure 9 was intended to compare income in 
Montana and the United States during the 
recession. Mostly it shows the influence of farm 
income on total income in Montana. The figures 
are seasonally adjusted, but they jump around 
quite a lot—due to the erratic nature of farm 
income. The chart does show that personal income 
in Montana fell further during 1974 and the first 
quarter of 1975 than it did in the United States, but it 
was falling from an unprecedented high. Even after 
the drop Montana was better off in comparison to 
the nation than during most of the past two 
decades. We don't have income figures for the last 
half of 1975, but we expect that Montana's total 
income for the year, in constant dollars, was lower 
than in 1974. We think that both farm and nonfarm 
income may have been down last year, after 
allowing for price increases.
Annual average employment figures often cover 
up fluctuations, but they do give us some idea of 
what happened to various state industries between 
1974 and 1975. Total employment in Montana 
increased in 1975, but our primary industries had 
their problems. Every basic industry except federal 





Farm 35,100 34,100 -1,000
Nonfarm 51,300 49,400 -1,900
Mining 7,500 6,800 - 700
Manufacturing 24,300 22,200 -2,100
Railroads 6,500 6,100 - 400
Federal government 13,000 14,300 1,300
The effect of the depressed national housing 
market was felt here as manufacturing employment
10Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Employment 
Security Division.
Figure 7
Employment in Montana and the 
United States, 1973-1975
Quarterly figures, seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division and U.S. Department of 
Labor.
Figure 9
Total Income in Montana and the 
United States, 1972-1975
Quarterly figures, seasonally adjusted.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.
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Figure 8
Unemployment in Montana and the 
United States, 1973-1975
m om m y ngures, seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division and U.S. Department of 
Labor.
fell by 2,100 workers—half of them in the wood 
products industry. Average yearly employment in 
mining was down 700 and still falling at the end of 
the year. As of November 1975, there were 2,500 
metal miners employed in Montana, compared to 
an average of 4,100 in 1974. The decline is a result of 
cut backs in the open-pit operations and a phasing 
out of the underground mines. The Anaconda 
Company says it is losing money on its 
underground operations, and presumably the 
underground mines are being closed per 
manently.
Railroad employment declined by 400 between 
1974 and 1975. So altogether we had a loss of 3,200 
jobs in the private nonfarm export sector (in 
mining, manufacturing, and railroads). The gain of 
1,300 in federal government helped off set the loss.
The decline in basic employment had its 
repercussions in the derivative industries:11
Derivative Employment, Montana
1974 1975 Change
Total 215,300 221,600 6,300
Utilities (except
railroads) 13,100 13,100 0
Construction 13,800 12,600 -1,200
Trade 59,100 59,300 200
Services and
finance 53,400 55,000 1,600
State and local
government 45,200 50,300 5,100
All other 30,700 31,300 600
The total number of derivative or secondary jobs 
increased again in 1975, but much more slowly than 
in other recent years. Wholesale and retail trade, 
which added 11,000 jobs between 1970 and 1974, 
added 200 jobs in 1975. The expansion in services 
and finance slowed too.
The 11 percent increase in 
government jobs between 1974 
and 1975 more than offset the jobs 
lost in the private sector
Construction, which is very cyclical, declined by 
1,200, mostly in heavy construction. Part of this 
decline was due to the near completion of Libby 
Dam.
The big influence in 1975 was the increase in state 
and local government employment—5,100 jobs in 
one year.
"Ib id .
If we add the 1,300 new federal jobs to the 
increase of 5,100 in state and local government, we 
have 6,400 new jobs in government in 1975:12
Total Employment, Montana
1974 1975 Change




industries 215,300 221,600 6,300
Private industry 243,500 240,500 -3,000
Government 58,200 64,600 6,400
Those 6,400 jobs offset the loss of 3,000 in the 
private sector and accounted for the net increase of 
3,400. They represent an 11 percent increase in 
government employment between 1974 and 1975. 
This compares to a 3.5 percent increase nationally. 
A year ago, we were talking about the slow growth 
of government employment, and I confess I was 
surprised to see this gain. I am told that much of it 
represents temporary employment funded by the 
federal government under CETA (Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act). In any case, without 
the government jobs, we presumably would have 
had a much higher unemployment rate than we did 
last year. Increases of this size are not likely to occur 
this year.
Of course, the recession affected different areas 
in the state differently. Hardest hit was western 
Montana, with its dependence on manufacturing. 
According to the estimates, unemployment 
averaged 13 percent in the Kalispell labor market 
area and 11 percent in Missoula last year. The Butte- 
Anaconda area was hurt by mining layoffs and 
reported an average unemployment rate of 9.4 
percent. Cascade County experienced an 8.0 
percent unemployment rate, the Helena area 6.9 
percent. The state figure was 8 percent.
In eastern Montana, rates of from 5 to 5.5 percent 
were common. The prices of wheat and cattle and 
the increasing costs of farm production were of far 
more concern there.
§
So Montana begins 1976 with high employment, 
high unemployment, and real incomes down from 
the highs of 1973. Let's speculate a bit about what 
the rest of the year may bring us.
We may as well recognize first of all that 
whatever one says about Montana's prospects can 
be contradicted by a poor crop year, or an
12lbid.
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unusually good one, or by an unexpected change 
in wheat prices because of something that happens 
somewhere else in the world.
But for this discussion let's assume that farm 
income continues near its recent (1974-1975) levels. 
In reading U.S. Department of Agriculture 
reports, I gather it believes that cattle prices may 
stay about the same this year, or increase a little. 
Wheat prices, nearly everyone agrees, depend 
nowadays on what happens to the world supply. 
Unless another severe shortage develops, how 
ever, we don't expect wheat prices to return to 
those extraordinary 1973 levels.
A standard middle-of-the-road forecast for the 
U.S. economy in 1976 seems to call for around a 5 
percent increase in real gross national product 
(after adjusting for price changes). The consumer 
price index is expected to increase around 6 or 7 
percent, with unemployment remaining high, 
probably averaging above 7 percent. In other 
words, our problems aren't going to disappear 
rapidly, but we should have a modest improvement 
in the U.S. economy this year.
We hope that improvement will mean an 
increased demand for Montana products. The 
consensus on the housing market seems to be for
an increase from 1.1 million starts last year to 1.5 
million or so this year. That does not promise a very 
good year, but it is an increase of 35 or 40 percent 
over 1975. If such an increase develops, it should 
put some western Montana mills back on a full 
schedule.
We would hope that increased industrial 
production at the national level might also put 
some other manufacturing workers, as well as some 
metal miners and railroad employees, back to 
work. I think we need to realize, however, that 
some of the declines in mining employment which 
occurred during the recession may be permanent. 
Underground mining may be a thing of the past in 
Butte. H
So we hope for some improvement in 1976, 
especially in western Montana where the recession 
has done the most damage.
But to me the big question of the mid-seventies is 
not the timing of the recovery from the recession, 
but how Montana will do during the rest of the 
ecade. If it is true that the state's economy has 
begun to perform better, can it continue to do so? 
Where will we be in 1980? Paul Polzin looks at 
projections for 1980 and 1985 in the following 
presentation. D
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" The economic well-being 
of Montanans will continue 
to improve, but at a rate far 
behind the rest of the nation"
T h e  reputation of economists has suffered in 
recent years due to their apparent inability to 
anticipate future economic trends. Newspapers 
often quote respected economists as stating 
something is certain to happen—for example, 
“there will be no recession/' “ inflation is coming to 
an end"—only to have them contradicted by the 
actual events. This track record seriously impairs 
the credibility of economists and throws doubt on 
the usefulness of examining future trends in 
Montana's economy.
To a large extent, the loss of faith in economists is 
due to a misunderstanding by the public of 
economic projections, one of the basic tools of 
economic analysis. Also, some of the blame must 
be placed on economists who make off-the-cuff 
remarks w ithout precisely defining their 
statements.
The logic behind economic projections
Economic projections consist of two essential parts; 
the underlying assumptions and the conclusion. 
Essentially, they may be viewed as “ if-then" 
statements. One example of a projection is “ if the 
interest rate falls (the assumption) then home 
building will increase (the conclusion)," or “ if the 
price of copper rises (the assumption) then 
Anaconda will hire more workers (the
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conclusion).” The important point is that a 
projection does not, by itself, say anything about 
the likelihood of the event. In the previous 
example, the assumption states, “ if the interest 
rates fall”; it does not imply that a drop in the 
interest rate will occur. It is legitimate to use 
projections to analyze unlikely events. For 
example, “if oil prices return to their previous level 
then the upward pressure on the consumer price 
index will be eased” is a valid projection even 
though it is improbable. Thus, the user of a 
projection must keep the underlying assumptions 
firmly in mind and the economist should 
specifically outline the assumptions he has made.
If an economist believes his assumptions are 
realistic—that is, he thinks they are likely to 
occur—then he may use his projection as a 
prediction of future events. Technically, these are 
called forecasts. The basic difference between 
projections and forecasts is that the latter includes, 
sometimes implicitly, an assessment of the realism 
of the assumption. If a number of alternative 
assumptions seem equally probable, the economist 
may choose to make a series of projections, with 
one projection corresponding to each assumption. 
A good example of this procedure will be shown 
later when the future population of Montana is 
discussed.
All of this may appear unnecessarily complicated 
to the layman who only wants a rough idea of 
future economic trends; he must first ferret out the 
underlying assumptions and then evaluate their 
realism. But, the real world—especially the world 
of economics—is not simple or easy to generalize. 
Economic projections are a very powerful and 
useful analytical device. They must, however, be 
used carefully because they may be easily 
misinterpreted.
The complexities of the assumptions underlying 
projections are, in fact, one of the strong points of 
this analytical method. For example, a projection 
need not be rejected simply because one or two of 
the assumptions are deemed inappropriate. 
Rather, these assumptions may be modified and a 
new projection derived with only a minimum 
expenditure of time and effort. This feature will be 
utilized when we examine the projections for 
Montana.
This lengthy discourse concerning the logic 
behind economic projections and their correct 
interpretation is not mere nitpicking. The following 
pages present projections which have some very 
important implications for Montana's economy. It 
is crucial that the rules are carefully spelled out in
advance so there will be no confusion or 
misinterpretation of the findings or the underlying 
motivations.
Explanation of projections 
used in this study
Four sets of projections for Montana's population 
and employment during 1980 and 1985 are 
presented in table 1. Before discussing them in 
detail, some information concerning their 
background and origin is presented.
OBERS is an acronym for the Office of Business 
Economics (now the Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, the two federal agencies which 
were primarily responsible for their derivation. 
OBERS provides a series of coordinated projections 
for the nation, all states, and selected multicounty 
regions, computed with alternative assumptions 
and standardized methodologies. Its projections 
have been widely accepted by various government 
agencies and private users. Essentially, the OBERS 
projections are extrapolations of trends as they 
existed during the late sixties and early seventies, 
supplemented with certain key assumptions.
The NPA projections are prepared by the 
National Planning Association of Washington, D.C. 
They are similar to OBERS in that they consist of a 
coordinated set of projections for the nation and all 
states. The major difference between the NPA and 
OBERS is in certain assumptions about the national 
economy for example, in the change in labor 
productivity and possible federal tax reforms—and 
in the manner in which economic growth is 
distributed among the various geographic areas.
The Montana Economic Study was conducted by 
the Bureau of Business and Economic Research at 
the University of Montana in Missoula. It has been 
widely accepted and quoted in Montana.
There are advantages and disadvantages to each 
set of projections. Both OBERS and NPA view the 
various geographic regions as interdependent; 
events in one area of the country are taken into 
account in the projections for other regions. On 
the negative side, the use of a single projection 
methodology implies that unique aspects of 
individual states or regions cannot be easily 
incorporated. The projections of the Montana 
Economic Study were derived within the 
framework of national projections but were not 
integrated with projections for other areas or 
states. These are the only projections done by 
Montanans and tailored to the state's economy.
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How the various sets of projections differ
Looking first at population, the upper portion of 
table 1 presents three projections for Montana. 
(The National Planning Association does not 
publish population projections for states.) It takes 
only a quick glance at these figures to see 
significant differences. OBERS “C” and the 
Montana Economic Study project a population of
720,000 to 725,000 in 1980. The OBERS “ E" 
projections, however, are more than 50,000 lower, 
at 669,700 residents in 1980. This provides a 
dramatic example of the effect of differences in the 
underlying assumptions. The two OBERS 
projections are essentially identical except for the 
birth rates.1 The “E”  series takes account of recent 
events and assumes a rapid decrease in births 
toward the net reproduction rate; the fact that they 
show a decline from the 1970 level of population 
has received much publicity. The “C” series uses a 
much higher birth rate, approximating the 
experiences during much of the sixties. The 
Montana Economic Study did not make explicit 
assumptions about birth rates. The effect of its 
methodology was to extrapolate the trends of the 
sixties, which results in its figures approximating 
series “ E” .
The dissimilarity between these projections is 
simply due to the differences in the number of 
births between 1970 and 1980. Demographers and 
other social scientists are not certain if current 
events represent a change in the long-run trend. 
Some argue that the low birth rates will continue, 
while others predict a return to a higher number of 
births. This difference of opinion provides a good 
example of projections using alternative  
assumptions. Rather than attempting to predict 
whether higher or lower birth rates are more likely, 
two sets of projections were made. Provided he 
knows the underlying assumptions, the user may 
then decide which he prefers.
Population projections vs. 
employment projections 
Population projections are fascinating and 
interesting; indeed, they are often considered 
newsworthy and receive considerable public 
attention. But, as was just shown, a change in one 
assumption can make a significant difference. 
Further, in the medium long-run—ten or fifteen
iThere are a few other minor differences, dealing mostly with 
assumptions concerning changes in the national economy. See 
1972 OBERS Projections, Series "E ," Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Water Resources Council, 1974), p. iii.
years in the future—population projections really 
say very little concerning the economic health of an 
area. Those born in 1970 will not be looking for 
work before 1987, or even later. Employment 
projections, on the other hand, reflect the ability of 
a region to provide jobs for its residents and are 
often interpreted as a barometer of overall 
economic conditions. The four sets of figures for 
Montana are shown in the lower portion of table 1.
Table 1
Alternative Projections of Population 





OBERS "C " 694,409 720,000 NA
OBERS "E" 694,409 669,700 667,100
Montana Economic Study 694,409 725,000 NA
NPA 694,409 NA NA
Employment
OBERS “ C " 254,088 262,500 NA
OBERS "E" 254,088 269,700 270,300
Montana Economic Study1 254,088 277,600 NA
NPA1 254,088 304,200 319,600
NA = not available.
’Adjusted to be comparable with OBERS.
Sources: (1970] U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census o f Popula 
tion: 1970, Vol. 1, Characteristics o f the Population, Part 28, 
Montana (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 
tables 16 and 53. Employment includes persons 14 years old 
and older. [OBERS “ C"] 1972 OBERS Projections, Series “ C ”  
Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: JJ.S. Water Resources Council, 1972), 
pp. 112-115. (OBERS "E"] 1972 OBERS Projections, Series '% ’ 
Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Water Resources Council, 1972), 
pp. 82-84. (NPA] Joe Won Lee and W illiam B.D. Hong, 
Regional Economic Projections: 1960-1985, Report No. 73-R-1 
(Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1973), p. 
563. [Montana Economic Study] Research Report o f the 
Montana Economic Study, Vol. 2 (Missoula: Bureau of 
Business and Economic Research, University of Montana, 
1970), p. 4.14.
Before examining the implications in detail, I 
would like to discuss the two OBERS projections. 
The “C” series projects 1980 employment to be 
262,500, while the corresponding figure in the "E” 
series is 269,700, a difference of about 7,000 
workers. These two values are in sharp contrast to 
the population projections, which differed by 
50,000. Notice, also, that the "E” employment 
projection is slightly larger. This is an example of
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the possible misconceptions which can be 
obtained by looking only at population 
projections. Specifically, series “E” projects more 




It requires only a quick glance at the four 
employment projections to detect significant 
differences among them.2 The two OBERS pro 
jections are the lowest, with values of 262,000 to 
269,700 for 1980 and 270,300 for 1985; the NPA 
projections, 304,200 in 1980 and 319,600 in 1985, are 
the highest; and the Montana Economic Study,
277,600 in 1970, falls in between. A detailed 
examination revealed that these projections were 
based on dissimilar assumptions; if they are 
standardized, the differences are greatly reduced.
"Employment projections reflect 
the ability of a region to provide jobs 
for its residents and are often 
interpreted as a barometer of overall 
economic conditions''
The OBERS projections are based on trends as 
they existed in the 1960's and very early 1970's. This 
period provides an acceptable foundation for 
projections because, with one major exception, 
conditions in Montana have not changed 
significantly in the last five years. The exception is, 
of course, coal development; the OBERS 
projections do not include the employment 
directly and indirectly associated with increased 
extraction and processing of Montana coal. If these 
workers are added to OBERS, the resulting 
employment projections more accurately reflect 
trends as they currently exist.3
A recent study concluded that coal development 
will directly and indirectly increase employment by
2The employment figures in table 1 have been adjusted so they 
are comparable because the published projections used 
different definitions. This involved converting the Montana 
Economic Study and NPA projections to the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census s concept of employment used by OBERS. Essentially 
this eliminates the double counting due to multiple lob 
holders and the use of an April reporting date. The 
employment figures in table 1 are not comparable to those 
reported by Maxine Johnson in the previous article.
Jln fact' the OBERS projections were used in precisely this 
manner to estimate the potential impact o f coal development
See Paul E. Polzin, Water Use and Coal Development in Eastern 
Montana (Missoula: Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research, University of Montana, 1974), pp. 114-126.
5,000 to 7,500 in 1980 and 6,000 to 10,600 in 1985.4 If 
the higher figures are added to the OBERS “E” 
projections, the resulting values are 277,200 for 
1980 and 280,900 in 1985. (Using OBERS "C" leads to 
a projection for total employment of 270,000 in 
1980.)
The NPA projections, on the other hand, are 
probably too high. Specifically, their assumptions 
concerning employment in agriculture, wood 
products, and government appear somewhat 
optimistic in light of current events.
NPA projects that agricultural employment in 
Montana will grow from 26,800 in 1970 to 32,100 in 
1985 and to 32,400 in 1985.* This represents a 
complete reversal of the 1950-1970 trend that saw 
^rio jltu ra1 employment decline by almost one- 
t ir . As shown earlier, employment on Montana's 
tarms and ranches has more or less stabilized since 
, but this may be only a short-run reaction to 
t e recent prosperity in agriculture. The past trends
plim'n ^  I hese figures have been adjusted to
eliminate multiple job holders.
5Jp°ro /^°n Lee,Ln,? William B D- Hong, Regional Economic
Na7inna?Pl‘ 1960~\985'  RePort No- 3 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Planning Association, 1973), p. 563.
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tow ard increased m e c h a n iza tio n  and  
consolidation, combined with the fact that the 
average age of Montana farm and ranch operators 
is 50 years, suggest that it is unlikely that farm 
employment will increase.6 Taking an optimistic 
view and assuming farm employment stabilizes at 
its 1970 level, we suggest that the NPA projections 
are about 6,000 employees too high in 1980 and 
1985.
Wood products employment in Montana is 
projected by NPA to grow from 9,100 in 1970 to 
13,300 and 14,000 in 1980 and 1985, respectively. 
Future developments in this industry are difficult to 
evaluate because they depend on the business 
cycle, events in other wood producing regions, and 
decisions made by the U.S. Forest Service. There is 
currently much debate concerning harvesting 
practices on Montana's forest land. Even though no 
definite conclusions have been reached, significant 
increases in timber removals on a sustained basis 
appear rather unlikely.7 Further, some experts 
believe that Montana may lose some of its 
competitive advantage to other timber growing 
regions in the United States, especially the South, 
and that the harvesting of roundwood from 
Montana's forests may actually decline during the 
next thirty years.8 Taking the middle ground and 
assuming wood products employment will increase 
to about 11,000 suggests the NPA total employment 
figures are an additional 2,000 to 3,000 workers too 
high in 1980 and 1985, respectively.
The final area of disagreement, and the one with 
the greatest potential error, concerns NPA's 
projection of government employment. In 1970, 
NPA reported 53,500 persons in Montana working 
for the federal, state, and local governments. By 
1980, it projects an increase to 77,300 and then a 
further rise to 86,600 in 1985. This growth is 
possible, but not very probable.9 State and local 
r g o vern m en t e m p lo y m e n t d id  grow  at 
| approximately the projected rate during part of the 
sixties, and Maxine Johnson has reported a sharp
6U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census o f Agriculture, 1969, Vol. 1, 
Area Reports, Part 38, Montana, Section 2, County Data 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.
7Dennis L. Schweitzer, Robert E. Benson, and Richard J. 
McConne, A Descriptive Analysis o f Montana's Forest 
Resources, U.S. Department o f Agriculture Forest Service 
Resource Bulletin INT-H (Ogden, Utah: Intermountain Range 
and Experiment Station, 1975), pp. 21-25.
8D. L. Holly, "Location of the Softwood Plywood and Lumber
I
 Industries," Land Economics, May 1970, pp. 127-137. 1972
OBERS Projections, Series "E," Vol. I, p. 106.
’The excessively high rate of growth projected by NPA has been 
criticized elsewhere. See Research Report o f the Montana 
Economic Study (Missoula: Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research, University o f Montana, 1970), pp. 431-432.
increase during 1974 and 1975. There is good reason 
to believe, however, that future employment 
growth at all levels of government will be much 
more moderate. There is currently strong political 
pressure to hold down the increases in government 
costs. This surely will be reflected in a more 
moderate growth in number of new employees. 
Further, much of state and local government 
employment is concerned with education, and the 
rapid increase in this sector during the past decades 
was probably due to rapidly rising enrollments 
caused by the post-war baby boom. There has been 
a drop in birth rates and this should moderate the 
long-run demands for additional facilities. Finally, I 
think the recent rise in state and local employment 
represents a short-run phenomenon primarily 
attributable to federal government contra-cycle 
policies. If it is assumed that government 
employment in Montana grows at the rate 
experienced between 1970 and 1974 (refer to 
Maxine's 1970 to 1974 table) the revised figures 
would be about 66,000 in 1980 and 75,000 in 1985, 
about 11,000 and 12,000 below those projected by 
NPA.
It is difficult to determine the exact assumption 
NPA made concerning coal development in 
Montana. It does project coal mining employment 
to increase by 800 workers between 1970 and 1980, 
with an additional 300 workers by 1985. This is 
approximately equal to the projections in a recent 
study.10 Thus, it appears safe to assume that the NPA 
projections of total employment do include 
significant increases in coal-related activities.
After changing the assumptions with respect to 
agriculture, wood products, and government, the 
NPA projections are about 23,000 and 27,000 
workers too high in 1980 and 1985. These totals are 
slightly greater than the sum of the individual 
industry adjustments because agriculture, wood 
products, and the federal government are basic 
industries; altering their employment requires 
further changes in derivative employment. 
Subtracting these totals from those shown in table 1 
leads to revised employment projections of 281,200 
and 292,600 for 1980 and 1985, respectively.
The Montana Economic Study did not anticipate 
the magnitude of likely coal development.11 On the 
other hand, it appears to have overestimated the 
decline in agriculture and was, perhaps, too 
optimistic about metal mining. These errors tend to
10Polzin, Water Use and Coal Development in Eastern Montana, 
pp. 108 and 113.
11Research Report o f the Montana Economic Study, pp. 4.13- 
4.33.
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counterbalance each other and reduce the 
discrepancy in the projection for total 
employment.
After standardizing the assumptions, the four 
employment projections are remarkably close. The 
revised figures for OBERS Series "E" are 277,200 in 
1980 and 280,900 in 1985. (The corresponding Series 
“C” projection for 1980 is 270,000.) The NPA 
projections are still higher, 285,200 in 1980 and
292,600 in 1985, but the differences between them 
and OBERS have been reduced. The Montana 
Economic Study, projecting 1980 employment at 
277,600, still holds an intermediate position.
Many more workers than jobs 
likely in 1985
Employment projections do not tell the whole 
story. They provide a rough idea of the number of 
jobs that will be available in Montana, but they say 
nothing about the number of persons available for 
work. The postwar baby crop has grown out of 
diapers and is entering the labor force in increasing 
numbers. Based on the 1970 census, roughly
151,000 young Montanans will enter the prime 
employment age groups between 1970 and 1980. At 
the same time, only about 55,000 persons will reach 
retirement age. This phenomenon is often called 
the “natural increase” in the labor force and 
implies that Montana must have growing 
employment opportunities simply to provide jobs 
for those persons already living here.
A rough idea of the potential labor market 
pressures may be obtained by “aging” the 1970 
population forward and applying projected 
participation rates to derive the expected number 
of persons in the labor force.12 Since those born 
after 1970 would not normally be looking for jobs 
earlier than 1985, no assumptions are made 
concerning future trends in the birth rate. This 
procedure is not designed to accurately describe 
Montana's future labor force. By 1980 or 1985, many 
persons living in Montana during 1970 may have 
left; to some extent, they may be# replaced by 
others with dissimilar characteristics. Rather, this 
method provides an indicator of the potential
increase in the labor force due only to persons 
already living in Montana.
The potential labor force for 1980 and 1985 based 
on Montana's 1970 population is presented in the 
upper portion of table 2. These figures show the 
labor force growing from 268,800 in 1970 to 321,900 
in 1980 and to 342,100 in 1985. This increase is due 
not only to a heavy concentration of young 
persons, but also to the projected changes in the 
participation of certain age-sex cohorts; for 
example, women have an increased propensity to 
look for jobs outside the home. Assuming a 6 
percent unemployment rate, roughly equal to 
Montana's experience between 1970 and 1974, 
employed workers will number 302,600 in 1980and
321,600 in 1985.
Table 2
Potential Labor Force, Revised Employment Projections, 
and Potential “ Job Gap”  in Montana 
1980 and 1985













Assumptions have been standardized. See text. 
Usmg OBERS E" Employment Projections. 
Using NPA Employment Projections.
12Age-sex participation rates for 1980 and 1985 have been 
projected in the following source: Denis F. Johnson, “ The U S 
Labor Force: Projections to 1990,”  Monthly Labor Review, July 
19/J, pp. 3-14. Montana's participation rates have often been 
lower than the national average. Consequently, the published 
tigures have been adjusted downward in light o f the 
participation rates reported in U.S. Bureau of the Census 
Census o f Population: 1970, Detail Characteristics, Final 
Report PC(1)-D28, Montana (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1972), table 164.
" 7  potential labor force and the number of 
employed workers may be used to place the 
projections in proper perspective. The revised 
employment projections are presented in the 
center portion of table 2. They show, for example,
? flf in mployment wil1 be between 277,200 and 
285,200 in 1985—ignoring the OBERS “C”
projection because there is no corresponding
value for 1985. On the other hand, there is the
















potential for 302,600 employed persons. This 
implies a “job gap”—an excess of persons available 
for work over the number of positions, even after 
allowing for 6 percent unemployment—of 
between 17,400 and 25,400. Similar calculations for 
1985 suggest that the “job gap” will grow to 
between 29,000 and 40,700.
What do all these numbers mean? They should 
not be interpreted as a prediction. In fact, they 
actually describe an impossible situation because 
modifying forces will have been at work long 
before 1980. Rather, they imply that the projected 
increase in the number of jobs, which includes 
significant coal development, will fall far short of 
the number of Montanans who would be available 
for work. In other words, Montana’s economy is 
not projected to create sufficient jobs for those 
who are already here (or were here in 1970).
The job gap means 
continued outmigration 
A major implication of these calculations is for 
continued net outmigration in the 1970s and 1980s 
as Montanans are forced to leave in search of jobs. 
It is very difficult to project reliably the number of 
migrants; as Maxine stated earlier, people move for 
many reasons and only some of these are related to 
employment. Further, even among those 
motivated by the job market, there is no precise 
relationship between the number of migrants and 
number of job openings. A very rough “ballpark 
figure can be obtained by assuming that there will 
be two persons associated with every job.13 In this 
case, the implied net outmigration (this is the 
excess of those leaving over those moving in) is 
34,800 to 50,800 from 1970 to 1980, with an 
additional 23,200 to 30,600 during the five years 
from 1980 to 1985. The maximum figure for the 
seventies is slightly less than net outmigration 
during the sixties, and that for the eighties is only 
marginally greater (assuming the trend would 
continue throughout the decade). Consequently, I 
think it is safe to conclude that although net 
outmigration will occur for the period as a whole, it 
will probably be less severe than during the sixties.
Relative decline in Montana's 
per capita income likely to continue
This analysis has emphasized projected labor 
market conditions and the continued outmigration
13This is an aggregate participation rate of .50, not unreasonable 
in light o f the fact that a greater than proportionate share of 
migrants tend to be in the prime working groups.
of Montanans in search of jobs. But, what about 
those who remain? Maxine earlier used per capita 
personal income to measure the economic well 
being of residents. This is not a perfect measure, 
equating well-being with money income, but it is 
easily understood and appropriate data are readily 
available.
Alternative projections for Montana’s per capita 
income, converted to constant 1958 dollars to 
eliminate the effect of inflation, are shown in table 
3. The NPA and OBERS “E” use slightly different 
1970 per capita incomes because the projections 
were not made at the same time and income 
estimates are periodically revised. Figures for 1968 
are presented for the Montana Economic Study 
and OBERS “C” because they were prepared 
before 1970 data were available. (There apparently 
were minor differences even in the 1968 values.)
Table 3
Per Capita Personal Income, Actual and Projected
Montana, 1970, 1980, and 1985
(In constant 1958 dollars)
1970 1980 1985
OBERS "C ” 2,460’ 3,590 NA
Percent o f U.S. 85’ 86
OBERS "E " 2,650 3,670 4,200
Percent o f U.S. 87 88 89
Montana Economic Study 2,470’ 3,330 NA
Percent o f U.S. 86’ 79
NPA 2,660 3,800 4,480
Percent o f U.S. 88 86 83
’ Per capita income for 1968.
Per capita income projections have not been adjusted for 
differences in underlying assumptions.
Sources: [OBERS “C”) 1972 OBERS Projections, Series " C "  
Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Water Resources Council), pp. 
112-115. [OBERS "E” ] 1972 OBERS Projections, Series "E, 
Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Water Resources Council, 1974), 
pp. 82-84. [Montana Economic Study] Research Report o f the 
Montana Economic Study, Vol. 2 (Missoula: Bureau of Business 
and Economic Research, University o f Montana, 1970), p. 4.41. 
[NPA] joe Won Lee and W illiam B.D. Hong, Regional Economic 
Projections, 1960-1985, Report No. 73-R-1 (Washington, D.C.: 
National Planning Association, 1973), p. 57.
There Is considerable variation among the 
alternative projections of per capita income in 
1980. They range from a low of $3,330 for the 
Montana Economic Study to $3,800 for NPA. 
Differences in the level of per capita income may 
be due to dissimilar assumptions about the change 
in wages, population, and other factors. (They 
correspond to the unadjusted employment 
projections in table 1.) Rather than detailing these
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differences, an overview concerning the trends can 
be obtained by comparing the Montana incomes to 
the average for the United States. This identifies 
whether or not the well-being of Montanans is 
projected to increase or decrease relative to the 
average for the nation. Notice that there are 
differences among alternatives in the projected per 
capita income for the United States.
The four alternatives are evenly divided in their 
opinions concerning the relative trend of 
Montana's per capita income. OBERS “C" and "E" 
both project per capita income to grow slightly 
faster in Montana than in the United States. For 
example, OBERS “E” reported Montana's 1970 per 
capita income to be 87 percent of the nationwide 
average, and this percentage is projected to rise to 
88 percent and 89 percent in 1980 and 1985, 
respectively. On the other hand, the Montana 
Economic Study and NPA project a relative decline 
in Montana's per capita income.
On the surface the projections appear to be in 
serious conflict, but the OBERS projection 
methodology contains a feature which almost 
assures that a state's per capita income will 
converge toward the national average.14 Thus, the 
important point is not that Montana's income is 
projected to increase faster than the nation's—this 
is an integral part of the methodology; the point is 
the rate at which Montana's figure approaches that 
of the United States. Both OBERS projections 
foresee a slow convergence toward the national 
average of only one percentage point from 1970 to 
1980 and one more point between 1980 and 1985.
These projections do not paint a very rosy picture 
for Montanans. At best, their economic well-being 
may improve slightly relative to the rest of the 
nation—this is primarily an assumption, not a 
conclusion, of the projection. At worst, the relative 
decline of the past decades will continue so that per 
capita income will be nearly 20 percent below the 
national average by 1985. The economic well-being 
of Montanans will continue to improve, but at a 
rate far behind the rest of the nation.
What can be done to halt, or at least retard, the 
relative decline in Montana's per capita income? 
This is not an easy question to answer. It is a 
problem which Montanans will have to address 
during the coming decades. The only real advice 
that can be given is that undue emphasis should not
’■•OBERS projections assume the earnings per worker in the 
individual industries at the national level w ill converge toward 
the all-industry rate. This implies the gradual elimination of the 
industry-mix’' effect as a cause of spatial differences in per 
capita income. See 7972 OBERS Projections, Series “ E ”  p iii
be placed only on the quantity of new jobs; the 
quality of these positions is also important. Earlier, 
in computing the potential "job gap," no mention 
was made of the pay of the new positions. 
Technically, any additional positions could help to 
fill this void. If economic well-being is a criterion, 
however, new low-paying and seasonal jobs—such 
as those often associated with the tourist 
industry—are definitely not very attractive. The 
ideal form of employment would be stable 
positions in industries paying above-average 
wages. They would simultaneously reduce the "job 
gap" and help to moderate the relative decline in 
economic well-being.
§
In summary, what do these projections say about 
Montana's economy during the coming five or ten 
years? First of all, Montana will certainly not be 
standing still. Total employment will grow by 27,000 
to 39,000 from 1970 to 1985, depending on which 
projection we choose. Further, per capita income 
will rise between 55 and 65 percent during the same 
period. These figures have been corrected for 
inflation and represent a significant improvement 
in the economic well-being of the average 
Montanan.
On the other hand, the projected increase in 
employment will not be sufficient to provide jobs 
for all Montanans who would like to work. This will 
probably lead to continued net outmigration, 
which may, however, be less severe than during the 
sixties. Finally, the projections suggest that the rise 
in Montana's per capita income will be less than 
the national average and that Montanans will not 
reap the benefits to the same degree as people 
elsewhere in the nation.
Before closing, I would like to point out that 
these projections put coal development
currently one of the most talked-about topics in 
the state into perspective. Keep in mind that the 
revised assumptions for the employment 
projections include significant coal-related activity. 
Yet, coal development will not have much impact 
on the state as a whole. Most of the new jobs will be 
in eastern Montana. In short, coal development 
will not be sufficient, by itself, to turn the state 
around. n
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ro• THE WOOD PRODUCTS INDUSTRY: 
PtW *  A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
MAXINE C. JOHNSON
M ontana is a very large state geographically. 
When we talk in terms of total state figures, we 
cover up some important differences among 
different parts of the state. This discussion 
concentrates on western Montana. I shall look at 
the area mostly in terms of its major industry 
—wood products— because what happens to the 
wood products industry in western Montana has a 
very great effect on this area's economy. In 
defining the industry, I include the paper mill in 
Missoula. Pulp and paper and wood products share 
a common resource base and each is dependent on 
the other.
First, let's look briefly at what happened to 
western Montana between 1950 and 1970, and 
compare it to the state as a whole (figure 1). The 
population increase in Montana over those two 
decades was very modest—about 17 percent. But in 
eight western Montana counties— Flathead, 
Granite, Lake, Lincoln, Mineral, Missoula, Ravalli, 
and Sanders—there were 38 percent more people 
in 1970 than in 1950. Over half the increase in 
population occurred in Missoula County.
Employment in all of Montana was up 14 percent 
between 1950 and 1970; in western Montana it 
increased 31 percent. Seventy percent of the new 
jobs in western Montana were in Missoula.
Total personal income (deflated for changes in 
price levels) increased 57 percent in Montana and 
68 percent in our eight counties. And per capita 
income was up 34 percent in the state and 43 
percent in western Montana (figure 2).
So western Montana's economy performed 
quite a lot better than the state economy between 
1950 and 1970. Actually, most of the gains in 
western Montana occurred during the sixties—not 
much change occurred between 1950 and 1960.
And we should note also that not all of the 
increase during the sixties represents a permanent 
gain. In 1970, Libby Dam was under construction up 
in Lincoln County; now that it is completed, 
population and employment have declined there. 
Nevertheless, the western Montana economy 
created quite a respectable number of new jobs, 
especially between 1960 and 1970, and individual 
incomes grew rather rapidly.
Figure 1
Changes in Population and Employment, Montana 
and
Western Montana, 1950-1970
Western Montana includes Flathead, Granite, Lake, 
Lincoln, Mineral, Missoula, Ravalli, and Sanders counties. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census o f Population, 
1950 and 1970.
Figure 2
Changes in Total and Per Capita Income, Montana 
and
Western Montana, 1950-1970
See figure 1 for list of western Montana counties. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Regional Economics Information 
System.
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It was mostly wood products that provided fuel 
for the economy. We talked earlier about 
Montana's primary industries, those industries 
which sell goods and services outside the state and 
thereby provide the basis for growth, or the lack of 
it: agriculture, manufacturing (including wood 
products), mining, railroads, and the federal 
government. Most of these industries reduced 
their employment in western Montana during the 
fifties and sixties:1






and fisheries -  3,200
Manufacturing, total 3,900
Wood products and paper 2,500
Aluminum 1,000
Mining -  50
Railroads -  1,100
Derivative industries 12,800
People were leaving the area's farms and ranches 
by the hundreds. Some 3,200 fewer persons were
’ Source: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, 
Employment Security Division. See figure 1 for list o f western 
Montana counties.
employed in agriculture in 1970 than in 1950. (The 
number is probably larger because the category 
includes forestry workers, and they increased in 
number.) Railroads were laying off workers. The 
loss in railroad jobs in the eight counties amounted 
to almost 1,100 over the twenty years. What kept us 
going was the wood products industry, which 
added 1,500 workers, and the aluminum plant in 
Columbia Falls, which was completed in 1955 and 
which employed about 1,000 people in 1970.
The 1970 figure understates the growth in wood 
products because 1970 wasn't a very good year. 
Figure 3, which shows total state employment in the 
industry from 1950 through 1975, gives a better 
indication of the long-term growth.
Federal government employment is missing from 
the table shown to the left. That's because these are 
census figures, and the census doesn't distinguish 
among federal, state, and local government 
employment. The census does distribute 
government employment by industry, so changes 
in Forest Service employment are incorporated in 
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. I remarked 
earlier that increases in forestry employment no 
doubt offset some of the loss in agricultural 
employment.
Overall we think federal employment increased 
over the two decades, especially during the 
sixties probably enough to offset the small
Figure 3
Wood Products Employment in Montana, 
1950-1975
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inuuaes  pulp ana paper. Ratio scale.
Source: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Employment Security Division.
Includes direct and indirect contribution.
Source: Maxine C. Johnson, “ Wood Products in M ontana/' Montana Business Quarterly, Spring 1972.
decline of 450 shown here for total primary 
employment.
So while primary or basic employment was 
declining rather substantially in the state as a 
whole, it was pretty much holding steady in 
western Montana, thanks largely to wood 
products. We think this explains why the area was 
able to increase its total employment and income at 
a considerably faster rate than the rest of the state. 
One other primary activity, difficult to measure, 
which no doubt played a role, was the tourist 
industry.
By the end of the 1960s, western Montana had 
become heavily dependent on forest products. 
From 1966 through 1969, average annual 
employment in the industry statewide ranged from
9,000 to 9,400. About 90 percent of this employment 
was in western Montana. In a report which I 
prepared several years ago, I found that in 1969 
approximately 43 percent of total employment in 
the eight western counties was either directly or 
indirectly attributable to the wood products 
industry (figure 4). That is, 43 percent of the people 
employed were either at work in the industry or in 
government timber management activities, or they 
were engaged in providing goods and services to 
the industry and its employees. So this estimate of 
43 percent includes not only the logger, the sawmill 
worker, and other industry personnel, but it also 
includes the heavy equipment dealer, the truck 
driver, the telephone worker, the grocery clerk, 
and the school teacher—all those who provide 
goods and services either to the industry or its 
employees.
During the same year (1969) 51 percent of the
total personal income in western Montana was 
attributable, either directly or indirectly, to the 
forest industries. Here again we include the income 
of industry employees and all those other people I 
mentioned. Although these estimates are as of 
1969, the relationships change quite slowly and I 
would think they have not changed much in the last 
few years.
The wood products industry is important not 
only in terms of total income, but because it pays 
good wages to individual workers. As we pointed 
out earlier, per capita income in Montana is low 
partly because we don't have enough workers in 
the higher-paying industries.
In spite of the fact that per capita income in 
western Montana has grown faster than in the state 
as a whole, per capita income here still is below the 
state figure, and well below the national. Here are 
the figures for 1973, the latest year available:2
1973 Per Capita Income
United States $5,023
Montana 4,742
Eight western Montana counties 3,830
Assuming that western Montanans want to live as 
well, on the average, as other Americans; assuming 
they want adequate public services, which they 
must pay for through taxes; then clearly the area 
needs all the well-paying jobs it can get, to boost 
that per capita income.
2Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Regional Economics Information Service.
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Contribution of the Wood Products Industry 
k to Western Montana, 1969
Figure 4
The following table shows what year-round wage 
and salary workers in industries important to 
western Montana earned—on the average—in 
1974. These are state averages. They do not include 
the self-employed businessman or professional 
worker. The smelting figure includes copper as well 
as aluminum. Clearly, the forest industries, 
including paper, provide some of the highest- 
paying jobs. These figures also say something about 
the desirability of substituting jobs in tourist- 
oriented businesses (trade and services) for jobs in 
wood products:3
Earnings of Year-Round Workers 
in Montana 
1974
Pulp and paper $12,640
Smelting and refining, nonferrous metals 10,974 
Wood products 9 304
Retail trade 5 515
Services 5 332
A ll covered industries 8,149
To summarize what I've been saying, then: 
western Montana has come to be very much 
dependent upon the forest industries. The 
industries have contributed to the growth of total 
employment and income and to the increase in 
individual incomes over the past two decades. 
What happens to those industries affects other 
business throughout the area.
§
Now, what is the forest products industry and why 
has it grown while other Montana industries were 
declining? The Montana industry includes logging 
camps, sawmills, plywood mills, the paper mill, as 
well as producers of particleboard, laminated 
beams, modular panels, molding, window frames 
and sashes, door frames, end-glued products, 
prefabricated houses, posts, and poles.
Many of these products were not produced in 
Montana in 1950, when we were largely a lumber- 
producing area. Some of the products I named are 
not very important. But the industry has grown and 
diversified over the past twenty years. Larger mills 
have modernized their plants, increased their 
capacity and efficiency, and added new products. 
National firms have moved into the state, building 
new plants or buying out established operations. A 
good many small producers have dropped out.
Some of us may regret both the loss of the small 
operator and our growing dependence upon out- 
of-state corporations. But there isn't much doubt > 
that the presence of larger, better-financed units 
producing a greater number of products has I 
contributed to a more efficient and more stable 
industry.
Timber resources, of course, explain the growth 
of the wood products industry in Montana. In the ] 
early fifties, the state was one of the few areas in the 
United States with timber to spare. Improved 
harvesting techniques had made it possible to ! 
harvest our steeper slopes, and improved milling 1 
methods permitted use of smaller logs. As timber 
supplies declined in other parts of the country, : 
producers looked to Montana. At the same time, 
the industry began to make greater use of the 
timber resource, with the production of paper, 
particleboard, and other products which utilize 
residues that once went to waste.
To keep things in perspective, we might note that 
the increases in Montana production had little 
effect on national output. Important as it is to us, 
the Montana industry is not so significant 
nationally. Our lumber production, for instance, 
usually amounts to less than 4 percent of total U.S. 
output.
§
Western Montana's dependency upon the forest 
industries has some disadvantages. I n spite of all the 
changes in recent years, the industry still is seasonal 
and cyclical. It would be nice if we had some other 
activities to help offset its instability.
Seasonal fluctuations in employment—those 
caused mostly by the weather—are not as serious 
today as they were in the fifties. Logging operations 
and smaller mills still shut down in the winter and 
spring, but the larger, diversified operations 
generally run year round.
For awhile in the sixties, it looked as though 
cyclical fluctuations—those caused by the business 
cycle—also were becoming less of a problem for 
the industry. Then came the recessions of 1970 and 
of 1974, and suddenly we were reminded again of 
our dependence upon national markets 
particularly the national housing market. Figure 5 
shows how changes in the number of housing starts 
affects Montana lumber production. Lumber, of 
course, still is our major product, and it's the only 
one we have yearly production figures for.JSource: Montana Department o f Labor and Industry 
Employment Security Division. Total includes only workers 
covered by unemployment insurance. The year 1968 saw an all-time high in the stat 
lumber output. Housing starts declined in 1969 a
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Figure 5
Montana Lumber Production and U.S. Housing Starts
1970, and so did Montana's lumber production. 
Then, between 1970 and 1972, U.S. housing starts 
rose to very high levels— reaching almost 2.4 
million units in 1972. Montana lumber production 
rose, too, but it never got back to the 1968 level. 
(The decline in 1972 is at least partly due to the 
closing of the Bonner sawmill for new construction 
and not to market conditions.) Then, in 1973, the 
housing market began to take a real tumble, one 
that continued into 1975. Housing starts in the 
United States in 1975 were less than half the 1972 
figure, and the average size of unit also declined as 
costs rose. Thus we had not only fewer units but less 
material required per unit. The 1975 production 
figure for Montana was the lowest since 1960. 
Between 1973 and 1975, lumber production fell by 
about 27 percent.
Employment declined sharply, too—by about 14 
percent or 1,400 workers between 1973 and 1975. 
Most of the decline occurred in late 1974 and in 
1975. It could have been worse; employers often 
chose to reduce the work week rather than lay off 
workers. The average number of hours worked per 
week fell from about 41 in 1973 to 36 in 1975. Even 
so, the unemployment rate last year averaged 
about 11 percent in the Missoula area (Missoula, 
Sanders, Mineral, and Ravalli counties) and 13 
percent in the Kalispell area (Flathead, Lincoln, and 
Lake counties), and layoffs in the forest industries 
were mostly responsible for the high rates.
The last seven years, then, have witnessed a great
deal of instability in wood products employment. 
We can only reflect on what it might have been like 
if we had been tied just to lumber as we were in the 
early fifties.
All of these figures are for the state; we don't 
have industry data for western Montana. As I said 
earlier, about 90 percent of wood products activity 
is in the eight western counties.
§
What does the immediate future look like for the 
forest industries? The F. W. Dodge Division of 
McGraw-Hill Information Systems Company says 
things may pick up some this year— but not a lot. 
Dodge, as you know, publishes a construction 
activity outlook report every year. Figure 6 gives 
their prediction of the demand for lumber, 
millwork, and plywood for use in new construction 
in 1976. They see the demand for these products up 
a little from last year (from 5 to 10 percent), but well 
below any other recent years.
The Dodge people base their prediction on the 
following assumptions. They see the current 
recovery as fragile. They point out that present 
national economic policy is conservative, 
especially in terms of monetary policy. Tight 
money, of course, always threatens the housing 
industry. They do anticipate some easing of the 
money markets, because 1976 is an election year.
They believe energy projects and the subsidies
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they require will have top federal government 
priority during the last half of the seventies, and 
that federally-subsidized housing will be a lower 
priority. Given the high cost of housing in relation 
to income these days, they see no way the housing 
boom of the early 1970s can be repeated without 
substantial subsidy programs.
Figure 6
New Construction Demand for Lumber, M illwork 
and Plywood, 1971-1976
has other problems too. Those problems have to do 
with the resource base—the timber. And there's no 
way we can talk about the future of wood products 
without considering these problems.
Twenty years ago, industry was expanding in 
Montana because timber was available. Most of it 
was in the national forests. Between 1952 and 1969, 
total timber harvested more than doubled, while 
timber cut on national forests increased 181 
percent—that is, it almost tripled. In the late sixties, 
about 60 percent of the timber cut in Montana 
came from the national forests.
As this huge increase in cutting continued, a 
good many people began to feel that the harvest 
was excessive and that it was damaging the 
environment. In the light of this environmental 
concern, public pressure, and new federal 
legislation, the Forest Service has reevaluated its 
management practices. The result has been smaller 
timber sales and increased harvesting costs on the 
national forests.
Constant dollars; seasonally adjusted. 1971 = 100 
Source: McGraw-Hill Information Systems Company.
In its report prepared in October, assuming no 
subsidies but with an easing of monetary policy, 
Dodge foresaw a maximum of 1.6 million housing 
units in 1976. Other forecasts say 1.5 million. (Since 
Dodge prepared its forecast, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development has announced a 
new home mortgage interest rate subsidy program 
for low and moderate income families. It should be 
in operation by spring and may provide financing 
for up to 250,000 new or rehabilitated units over the
Figure 7 shows what has happened to Forest 
Service timber sales over the past twelve years. 
Before 1970, timber sales fluctuated mostly because 
of economic conditions. Since 1970, the major 
influence has been the amount of timber the Forest 
Service has offered for sale. There was a very sharp
Figure 7
National Forest Timber Sales, Fiscal Years 1964- 
1976, and Uncut Timber 
Under Contract at End of Year
next two years.) The 1.6 million units would be a 
gain of 40 percent over 1975, but the number still 
would be below housing's boom years of 1971- 
1973. Furthermore, Dodge economists see only 1.7 
or 1.8 million new units in 1977. If they are in the 
ball park, then, the housing industry may soon 
recover to what used to be (before 1971) quite a 
respectable level—one that should create a better 
market for Montana wood products.
The paper market has been picking up some 
recently. The Missoula mill expects to run without 
interruption through April 1. Its management 
expects a better year in 1976, with fewer layoffs than 
in 1975. The mill employs about 500 people.
The forest industries have had some difficult years 
recently, thanks to the national recession and the 
instability of the housing market. But the industry
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Ratio scale
Source: U.S. Forest Service, Region 1.
decline of more than 50 percent between 1970 and 
1972, and it caused the industry a great deal of 
concern. Since 1972, sales have increased gradually.
1 The projected figure for fiscal 1976, the year ending 
next June 30, is 662 million board feet. This includes 
95 million feet of dead and down timber, thinning, 
etc., suitable for pulp and particleboard but not for 
j lumber. Nevertheless, 1976 Forest Service sales 
\ should be the highest since 1970.
The industry has been cutting less timber on the 
I national forests recently, partly in response to the 
I  reduced supply and partly because of economic 
I conditions. Still, the amount of national forest 
timber under contract today is about 20 percent 
less than it was during the late sixties. This is about a 
two years' supply under normal cutting conditions. 
Mills like to have about two and one-half years' 
supply on hand. It gives them a greater flexibility in 
their operations, and their bankers like to know 
that they have raw materials available.
The smaller volume of timber sold has, of course, 
resulted in increased competition and higher 
! stumpage prices. But the new management policies 
also have meant higher harvesting costs as the 
industry is required to meet new standards for 
roads, cleanup, etc.
I am not a forester and I cannot evaluate either 
the policies or the way they are being applied. Like 
most people, I recognize that higher costs are 
necessary to protect environmental values; like 
others, I am uneasy at the apparent absence of 
adequate economic yardsticks in some decisions.
In any event, what all of this means is higher 
production costs.
As the harvest on national forest lands has 
declined, the cut on private lands has increased. In 
calendar 1974, there was as much timber cut off 
private lands as off the national forests in Montana. 
To those of us accustomed to thinking of the 
national forests as the predominant source of 
timber in this area, that really is surprising. It's fairly 
obvious, however, that private lands have provided 
a cheaper source of timber during this recession 
period. I suppose the question is whether the 
current rate of harvest can be maintained, and for 
how long.
All of this has implications for the western 
Montana economy and for western Montana 
business and labor. They both have a stake in a 
healthy forest industry.
This area is heavily dependent on wood 
products, and at the moment we have very few 
feasible alternatives. I think of no other basic, 
primary industry which, in the foreseeable future, 
is likely to provide large numbers of new jobs in 
western Montana.
Some people think that tourism and outdoor 
recreation offer a suitable alternative. I disagree. 
We looked earlier at earnings in various Montana 
industries, and we saw that workers in the trade and 
service groups—and that is where businesses 
catering to tourists are classified—earn very low 
wages compared to wood products and paper
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employees. Jobs in motels and restaurants are not 
satisfactory substitutes for work at the sawmill.
I would hope that we could have both a healthy 
forest industry and a substantial tourist industry. 
However, I would tend to regard tourism as an 
activity providing supplemental employment and 
earnings, and not as a desirable economic base.
In an article in the Autumn 1975 Montana 
Business Quarterly, Paul Polzin and Dennis 
Schweitzer estimated that it would take 4,260 
typical out-of-state tourists to generate the direct 
income produced by the processing of 1 million 
board feet of timber. Among their conclusions as to 
the impact of wood products versus tourism were 
these:
1. Simply looking at total expenditures by out- 
of-state tourists leads one to dramatically 
overestimate the dollars which end up in the 
pockets of Montanans. They estimated that only 20 
to 25 cents of the average nonresident tourist dollar 
becomes direct income to residents of the state.
2. For all practical purposes, the state could not 
generate sufficient growth in tourism to 
counterbalance even moderate declines in timber 
harvesting.
3. Even if we could generate the same amount of 
direct income by substituting tourism for wood 
products activities, there would be severe 
repercussions in the labor market, because of the 
very different kinds of jobs in the two industries.
4. And the authors reiterate the statement that I 
made earlier, that we should be able to have both 
industries. They point out that tourism does make 
an important contribution to the Montana 
economy.
§
Wood products will continue to provide western 
Montana’s economic base, and it may even provide 
some new jobs over the next few years. We will see 
greater use of forest residues—materials formerly 
left in the woods after logging—and of timber 
unsuitable for sawlogs. The Hoerner Waldorf 
Corporation has labeled this 5 D wood—meaning
trees that are dead, dying, down, diseased or 
defective.
The forest industries are not likely to expand as 
they did in the fifties and sixties, but they will 
provide some new jobs between now and 1980.
A great deal depends on the availability of the 
resource especially sawtimber. I would expect 
that when this recession ends, the housing market 
picks up, and the demand for lumber is high again, 
we’ll be hearing more about Forest Service timber 
sales and other federal policies.
It seems to me there are at least two things all of 
us can do for our own self-interest, as well as for the 
welfare of the western Montana economy. First, we 
can insist on reasonable compromises with respect 
to public lands management—compromises that 
include economic welfare as part of our 
environment. We can do that, I believe, without 
relinquishing a concern for the physical 
environment. And second, we can encourage 
greater investment by the federal government in 
timber production and management in those areas 
of Montana where such an investment is justified. 
Efforts such as these will help the industry and all of 
western Montana. □
Erratum:
P. 49, Montana Business Quarterly, Autumn 
7 5 .  The negative 18,830 present dollars indicates 
that the borrow-purchase option is more desirable
than the lease o p tio n ------” should be “The
negative 18,830 present dollars indicates that the 
lease option is more desirable than the borrow- 
purchase option . . .
The Wood Products Industry/Maxine C. Johnson
WILL COAL 
GASIFICATION 
COME TO THE 
NORTHERN 
GREAT PLAINS?
Interest in the gasification of coal has grown 
substantially in the last few years, as natural gas use 
in the United States has increased and proved 
reserves have fallen.1 Since the states of Montana, 
t Wyoming, and North Dakota have large supplies of 
coal accessible by stripping at relatively low cost, 
much of the nation's interest is focused in this 
region. Water, another crucial input to coal 
gasification, also is available though the social cost 
of using water in this fashion is being vigorously 
debated. The extent of coal gasification over the 
next several years will do much to determine the 
total impact— feared by some, desired by 
others—which coal development will have on the 
region.
The history of coal gasification technology goes 
back to 1670.2 Probably the most thoroughly 
proven technology is that used in Lurgi units, of 
which more than fifty have been built. The Lurgi 
process, first developed in Germany over fifty years 
[ ago, combines crushed coal with steam and oxygen 
[ under high pressure to make a mixture of 
hydrogen, hydrocarbons, nitrogen, and carbon 
oxides. However, the production of pipeline- 
quality gas requires that the commercially 
L . unproven process of methanation be used, 
removing all carbon monoxide, some carbon
’ The reserves-to-production ratio fell from 18.9 in 1963 to 9.7 in 
1973. Federal Power Commission, National Gas Survey 
(Preliminary Draft), Vol. I (n.p., n.d.), p. 31.
2For a brief history and description of coal gasification 
technology, see Office of Coal Research, U.S. Department of 
the Interior, Evaluation of Coal Gasification Technology, Part I: 
Pipeline Quality Gas (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1973).
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dioxide, and raising the heating value to 900-1,000 
British thermal units per standard cubic foot 
(Btu/scf). Newer technologies are also being 
explored, but the first plants are expected to use 
the Lurgi process with methanation.
The decision as to how much coal, water, capital, 
and other resources to devote to coal gasification 
is, of course, an economic decision. To predict the 
time path of gasification development one must 
consider both the cost and the value of the 
product. It is also true that simple managerial 
economics is insufficient in this case to yield good 
predictions. Governmental regulation of gas 
production, pricing, and distribution, as well as 
plant siting, water use, and other aspects of plant 
location, make this a question of political economy. 
The forecaster's judgments must be tempered by 
recognition of these nonmarket determinants. Still, 
the purely economic factors seem likely to have a 
powerful influence. If expected costs are very 
much higher than expected product value, it seems 
unlikely that extensive development will occur. 
Likewise, costs which are relatively low would be 
expected to militate persistently for development 
of facilities. Even though government has the 
power to purchase for people that which costs 
more than it is worth to those people (individually 
or as a group), and the power to tax low-cost (to 
individuals or to society) alternatives out of 
existence, we believe that when the costs clearly 
are too great, a program is not likely to be 
undertaken.
An expensive and untried process 
Since commercial-scale plants to make SNG 
(substitute natural gas) from coal have never been 
built in the United States, there is substantial 
uncertainty concerning costs. However, the 
'"Synthetic Fuels from Coal" Task Force Report of 
the Project Independence Report provides cost 
estimates for high-Btu gas plant construction. Both 
capital requirements and projected fuel prices are 
uniquely usable, in that breakdowns of component 
costs are given along with the projections. Those 
projections are the basis for the following cost 
estimates.
In late 1973 dollars, total capital requirements for 
a 23-billion Btu-per-day (approximately 250 million 
cubic feet per day) plant with methanation were 
estimated at $427,097,000.3 Assuming coal costs of 
$4 per ton and (unrealistically) utility financing at 9
‘U.S. Department o f the Interior. “ Synthetic Fuels from  Coal”  
Task Force Report of the Project Independence Report 
(Washington. D.C.: Government Printing O ffice, November 
1974).
percent, a unit price of $1.44 per million Btu was 
derived.4 When these assumptions are updated, 
with capital investment at $800 million,5 coal at 
$4.50 per ton,6 interest rates at 9 percent, and using 
updated operating cost figures, the cost rises to 
$2.18 per million Btu, in late 1974 dollars. A more 
recent and concrete estimate of unit price comes 
from the American Natural Gas Company, 
proposing a Lurgi plant in North Dakota. Their 
current estimate is $2.58 per thousand cubic feet 
(roughly comparable to and somewhat lower than 
a million-Btu price). This price includes limited 
transportation to the distribution network and is 
given in late 1974 dollars.
Estimates assuming other than utility financing 
project a considerably higher price of gas from the 
same plant. Given the uncertainty involved, 
traditional utility-style financing, based on 
minimum risk considerations, appears to be 
inappropriate. Project Independence arrives at a 
price of $2.55 per million Btu when the plant is 
investor-financed with a 15 percent discounted 
cash flow (DCF).7 This figure is projected under cost 
assumptions similar to the $1.44 figure that assumes 
9 percent utility financing. If the 15 percent DCF 
numbers have changed by the same percentage as 
the utility finance figures, the appropriate cost 
becomes $3.86 per million Btu. Recent off-the- 
record conversations with industry and 
government personnel, as well as newspaper 
reports, suggest that updated cost figures would be 
about $1.3 billion for plant construction, and about 
$4.50 per million Btu for gas output in 1975 dollars. 
4lbid.. p. 36.
*T ° k  a conversation w ith  Dr. Seay, American Institute o f Gas 
l echnology, concerning the proposed Four Corners area and 
North Dakota coal gasification projects.
6An aggregate figure o f 14 m illion  tons o f bitum inous coal 
shipped from Montana mines in 1974, as reported by Ralph 
King Associate D irector o f the Montana Bureau o f M ines, in a 
telephone conversation, July 2 4 ,1975.
Project Independence Report, p. 36.
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However, the $3.86 figure is both defensible and 
more conservative, and we will use it for later 
comparisons.
In any cost consideration of synthetic coal gas, it 
should be kept in mind that pipeline-quality gas 
production is not a com m ercially proven  
technology. Further research and development 
need to be funded and carried out before the first 
plant operates. For example, significant amounts of 
development are required in high-pressure feed 
systems,6 *8 pollutant analysis and contro l,9 
application of technology to various coal types,10 
the methanation process,11 and scaling-up 
processes from experimental to commercial size.12
In addition to these more scientific areas of 
research and development, work is needed on 
engineering problems of actual plant construction. 
These include unsolved problems of field erection 
and fabrication of pressure vessels.13 The large size 
of such vessels precludes shop fabrication and 
necessitates field adaptions of precision techniques 
previously untried.
Substitute natural gas: 
too costly to compete?
The value of gas made from coal is determined by 
the value of (demand for) energy, and the price, 
availability, and suitability in use of energy from 
other sources. Greater demand for energy 
increases the value of SNG, while lower price, 
greater availability, and greater suitability in use of 
other energy sources lowers the value of SNG.
Energy use in the United States has been rising 
for many years; in 1974, however, energy 
consumption fell by 2.7 percent.14 This is consistent 
with the fact that in real terms (corrected for 
inflation) energy prices fell steadily for decades 
until 1973, when they began to rise sharply.15 The 
available estimates indicate that energy use will 
decline from 1.5 percent to 5 percent if energy
6Evaluation o f Coal Gasification Technology, pp. 23, 39, 44-45;
James R. Garvey and others. Final Report o f the Supply-
Technical A dvisory Task Force—S ynthetic Gas-Coal 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Power Commission, April 1973), p. 
VI-2.
' 9Project Independence Report, pp. 23, 83-90; Final Report, 
Chapter X.
10Project Independence Report, p. 24.
11 Evaluation o f Coal Gasification Technology, pp. 26, 44; Final 
Report, pp. VI-4, VI-5.
12Project Independence Report, p. 24.
13lbid., pp. 63, 68-70,118.
14Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report to the 
President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1975).
15Edward M itchell, “ The Energy Dilemma: Which Way O ut?/
Reprint No. 32 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute, June 1975), p. 3.
prices rise 10 percent.16 Of course, the economic 
recession of the time, social pressures, and 
population growth probably had significant 
impacts also. To calculate the demand for SNG as a 
function of its price, one must consider these 
factors as well as the prices of substitutes.
The most important competitor for SNG is, 
presumably, natural gas. Both the price of natural 
gas and its supply are critical determinants of the 
need for gasified coal. Indeed, recent shortfalls of 
natural gas supply are the reasons for serious 
co n s id e ra tio n  of the  te c h n o lo g y . An 
understanding of the nature of these shortages is 
crucial to a reasoned analysis of the supply options 
available.
While natural gas has a high value, especially to 
home consumers, due to its clean and continuously 
deliverable nature, the Federal Power Commission 
controls its price below a market-clearing level (the 
amount produced that equals the amount 
demanded). Until recently (1970), new wellhead 
prices were below $.20 per thousand cubic feet. 
With prices controlled at this level, the value of gas 
was understated, demand for it was overstimulated, 
and incentives to explore and produce were 
retarded. Now, the Federal Energy Administration 
has projected forced curtailments of gas contracts 
of 2.9 trillion cubic feet for the twelve months 
starting April 1975, as reported in Weekly Energy 
Report for September 1,1975. Production for 1974 
was approximately 22 trillion cubic feet. Some 
states will see cutbacks of up to 45 percent of 
demand at the regulated price. Dislocations from 
shortages of this magnitude can and will be serious, 
but will the considered costs and value of SNG lead 
to its use in plugging the supply-demand gap?
A critical question is whether gas could be made 
available at prices lower than SNG costs, in great 
enough quantities to eliminate SNG demands. To 
answer this question quantitatively requires the 
consideration of many forces interacting in 
dynamic and complex ways. Such a study has 
recently been done at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Energy Laboratory, primarily by Paul 
MacAvoy and Robert Pindyck.17 Their econometric 
modelling and simulation of phased deregulation
16Nathan Edmonson, “ Real Price and Consumption of Mineral 
Energy in the U.S., 1900-1968,”  Journal o f Industrial Economics 
(Manchester, England), forthcoming; Edward Hudson and 
Dale Jorgenson, “ Energy in the United States: Projections and 
Policy”  (manuscript submitted to the Ford Energy Policy 
Project, 1974).
17Paul MacAvoy and Robert Pindyck, The Economics o f the 
Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), (Amsterdam: North- 
Holland Co., 1973).
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of natural gas indicates that at an average wholesale 
price by 1980 of $.61, the amount of natural gas 
supplied would satisfy demands, leaving no market 
for the more expensive SNG. Their calculated 
supply responses are questioned by some experts.18 
Yet even if their projected equilibrium price were 
quadrupled to $2.44 per million Btu, SNG produced 
with investor financing at $3.86 per million Btu 
could not compete. In the Northern Plains states' 
own markets, partially dependent on Canadian gas 
imports of questionable future, fully continued 
reliance on natural gas may require new pipeline 
construction which might be more extensive than 
construction required to move SNG made within 
the region. No estimates of such cost comparisons 
are available, to our knowledge, but the spread 
between $.61 and $3.86 is so great that a reversal of 
cost positions seems very unlikely.
Another important competitor, at least for 
industrial sales of SNG from coal, is coal itself. At a 
price of $4.50 per ton, coal costs about $.265 per 
million Btu,19 as compared to the $3.86 per million 
Btu cited above for SNG. Much of coal's 
substitutability with gas is dependent on the 
availability of pollution control technology;20 and, 
of course, transport costs and burning efficiencies 
will differ. Still, coal appears to be a much cheaper 
supplement to natural gas in many large-scale uses 
than SNG.
While large-scale and industrial gas users may be
As a basis for their supply response projections, MacAvoy and 
Pindyck used physical gas reserve estimates from the Potential 
Gas Committee, an industry organization unique in its access 
to proprietary information.
For purposes of comparison, below is listed the PGC 
estimate of potential supply along with comparable estimates 
from other sources. (These figures do not include proved 
reserves.)
™ ient,i,?1 Gas Committee (as of 12/31/72, excluding Alaska) - 
780 trillion cubic feet.
COMRATE (Committee on Mineral Resources and the 
Environment, Commission on Natural Resources, National 
Research Council) (National Academy of Sciences, 1975) - 530 
trillion cubic feet.
King Hubbert (well-known mineral resource analyst for the 
U.S. Geological Survey) (1974) - 540 trillion cubic feet. 
Vincent JvIcKelvey (Director, U.S. Geological Survey 1975) - 
320-655 trillion cubic feet. X '
19The price of coal varies widely with location, coal 
characteristics, and mining conditions, but $4.50 per ton is 
roughly representative of early 1975 prices in the Northern 
Great Plains region. The $4.50 figure is the same one used in 
calculating SNG costs above. These calculations assume 17 
million Btu per ton of coal. Note that as coal at the mine rises in 
price, SNG energy rises in cost faster than does energy from 
coal burned directly, since more coal is required to produce a 
unit of SNG energy.
Mj 0r a recent summary on the crucial problem of flue gas
desulfurization, see J. Jonakin, “ Solving the SO? 
Problem—Where We Stand with Applications and Costs "
Coal Age, May 1975.
expected to react promptly to higher gas costs, the 
residential and commercial space heating sector is 
likely to exhibit a more inelastic, slower response. 
Still, competitive alternatives exist. Electricity, 
generated from coal or other sources, is a relatively 
low-cost option considering modern heat pump 
technology. O. Hammond and M.B. Zimmerman,21 
of the M.l.T. Energy Laboratory, project heating 
costs significantly lower from electricity-powered 
heat pumps than from SNG, using assumptions 
biased in favor of SNG technology and gas-burninc 
efficiency.22 2*
In some cases, fuel oil, liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG), and low-Btu gas produced for nearby boilers 
may also compete with SNG, but generalizations 
are difficult, as estimates on price and availability 
vary. The outlook regarding solar, wind, tide, and 
other more exotic energy sources also varies with 
the observer. However, many believe that by the 
year 2000, substantial production from one or more 
of these sources is likely.
No coal gasification likely in this decade
Since predicting the time path of coal gasification is 
a problem in political economy, some assumptions 
must be made regarding the goals or preferences to 
be exhibited by decisionmakers in and out of 
government. The fundamental assumptions made 
here are that energy users will try to minimize the 
cost of energy consumed, and will react to higher 
energy prices by decreasing their energy use. 
Available data support these notions. Also, it will be 
assumed, as least in the "most probable" 
projections, that regulatory agencies move in the 
direction tending to encourage cost minimization 
in energy supply.
Given the cost estimates for SNG from coal, and 
the apparent availability of natural gas at costs 
much less than SNG cost estimates, the market for 
SNG seems not to exist. Even if the M.l.T. market 
clearing price of $.61 per million Btu of natural gas 
•s quadrupled, natural gas should be cheaper than 
NG. The long-run availability of gas is very much in
2,Ogden Hammond and Martin Zimmerman, “ The Economics
JulyM ugus,aiS975.SymhetiC CaS' "  rech " ° '° S y  | | | g
“ Included in the assumptions were SNG prices (delivered) at 
$3̂ 65 per million Btu and electricity at $.043 per kilowatt-hour. 
Adoption of heat pump technology may be more likely, or 
Nnr,hLmP m •nt' ° r p?tential SNG export markets than for the
nnmn « P amS sta,es own demands, due to decreased heat 
pump efficiency at very low temperatures.
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question, however, as geologic experts disagree on 
potential production from reserves (see footnote 
18). Virtually all estimates, though, appear to 
suggest that we can continue to have domestic gas 
availability beyond the year 2000, provided that 
annual use does not increase dramatically and 
much higher prices should strongly encourage 
conservation rather than greater use. Also, even if 
natural gas is available in substantially smaller 
quantities, the cost advantage of energy derived 
directly from coal, along with coal's acceptability in 
industrial markets, will allow existing industrial gas 
supplies to be channeled to other, higher-valued 
uses.
All factors considered, we forecast that there will 
be no commercial production of SNG in the 
Northern Plains in 1980 or 1985. Since commitments 
must be made in the next two to four years for 
production by 1985, we are reasonably confident in 
this forecast. To predict output of SNG (or any 
other commodity) in the year 2000 is exceedingly 
difficult. Society's ignorance of fossil fuel 
reserves—which is rational in light of the cost 
involved to learn much more—together with the 
uncertainty of foreign fuel source prices and 
availabilities, makes forecasting natural gas 
production for the year 2000 almost a guessing
game. We arbitrarily will assume that cost 
relationships, technology, and regulatory factors 
will remain close enough to the currently 
foreseeable situation that SNG production also will 
remain infeasible economically at that point.
Obviously, if we change our assumptions to be 
more adverse toward SNG production, our "low" 
forecasted amounts would remain at zero. If we 
change our assumptions to be more favorable 
toward SNG production, the predictions could 
change. For example, if technological advances 
substantially reduced SNG costs, and if natural gas 
were far less available in the future even at much 
higher prices (or at low controlled prices), while 
engineers were unable to design environmentally 
acceptable ways to switch many users from gas to 
coal, then SNG might become feasible.23
Another possibility is that with continued strong 
regulation holding down the domestic price and 
availability of natural gas and oil, the resulting 
shortages might produce such pressures that 
instead of allowing higher natural gas and oil
23Another factor of some importance in the Northern Plains is 
the potential elimination o f Canadian supplies, although such 
a move would seem to be a large economic error on Canada's 
part, given the price they get for the exports as compared with 
internal Canadian prices. In the national picture, these 
amounts are small.
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prices. Congress might grant enormous subsidies in 
an effort to supplement supply and to encourage 
SNG production.24 The apparent rationale for such 
a move would be to keep gas prices low to the 
consumer. But with presently projected SNG costs, 
the social cost of such energy would certainly be 
higher than under alternative regulatory and 
technological options.
The high cost of synthetic gas could be masked, 
to some extent, by averaging the cost in with 
regulated, low-priced natural gas ("rolling in”), 
thus making the gas marketable and the venture 
profitable for the producer. But a rolled-in price is 
artificial in that it doesn't represent the true cost to 
society of producing the gas. When the social cost 
(eventual consumer and taxpayer cost) is realized, 
SNG emerges as a high-cost solution.
Because of our assumption that regulators tend 
toward economic rationality, we do not really 
expect that chain of events to occur, but we 
recognize its possibility, so that our “high” 
forecast, at this point rather arbitrary in nature, is 
that while no plants will be in production by 1980, 
one in each state will be operating by 1985, with no 
further change by the year 2000.
Summary of Projections 
SNG Plants in Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota
1980 1985 2000
Most probable 0 0 0
Low 0 0 0
High 0 3 3
Note: All plants rated at 250 million standard
cubic feet per day.
Not everyone agrees
The projections we have made are generally lower 
than other contemporary forecasts of gasification 
activity. We would particularly like to address the 
differences between this report and that of the 
Northern Great Plains Resources Program 
(NGPRP), possibly the most extensive and visible of 
those other forecasts.
-MFor a discussion of this possibility, see Richard Stroup and 
Verne House, “ The Political Economy of Coal Gasification: 
Some Determinants of Demand for Western Coal," Staff Paper 
75-17 (Bozeman: Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Economics. Montana State University, 1975).
The NGPRP report. Effects of Coal Development 
in the Northern Great Plains (Denver, April 1975), 
forecasts three Coal Development Profiles: one 
“probable,” one “high,” one “ low.” Their most 
probable projection is for no SNG plants in 1980, 
seven in 1985, and sixteen in 2000. Their high 
projection is for seven plants in 1980, thirteen in 
1985, and forty-one in 2000. Their low projection 
predicts no gasification activity up to 2000.
NGPRP's section on gasification is a small part of a 
much larger report on coal activity in general. 
Presumably because of the section's size relative to 
the complete report, little information is given as to 
the methodology which led to the specific 
numbers used in the gasification forecasts. This 
makes comparison difficult. But general 
assumptions of energy growth and relative prices 
were made explicit; and, on the basis of these, the 
following comparisons are offered.
First, consider the area of technological 
certainty. While the NGPRP report is dated April 
1975, the synthetic gas component apparently was 
completed soon after June 1974, when “a number 
of energy companies” had shown “substantial 
interest” in Northern Great Plains gasification and 
had “ invested in research programs and plant 
development planning.” At that time, they listed 
over half a dozen announced plants to be built in 
the area.
At this writing (Otober 1975), no plants have 
gone beyond the planning stage; industry as a 
whole seems to be waiting for either technological 
breakthroughs or government subsidy. All known 
projects have been indefinitely shelved. A 
quotation from the September 1,1975, Oil and Gas 
Journal sums up this attitude: “Commercial and 
technological uncertainties are too great for 
financing at this time, given the questions over 
markets, prices, costs, and performance of facilities 
once constructed.”
A second assumptive difference leading to 
different conclusions in the two reports is over the 
question of future supply and demand for natural 
gas.
NGPRP's energy demand forecasts came from a 
Department of the Interior publication. United 
States Energy Through the Year 2000 (1972). From 
the total demand figure, gas was allocated a share 
of the market based on current usage patterns. 
Characterizing the Department of the Interior 
forecast is a quote from a draft of the NGPRP 
report, . . . this forecast is essentially an 
extrapolation of current trends based on a 
knowledge of how the various sectors of the
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economy use energy and how these sectors are 
growing. It does not deal explicitly with the effect 
of price changes on the demand and supply of 
energy resources, and, consequently, does not 
recognize any energy savings or supply increases 
that could result from persistent increases in 
energy prices/'
The NGPRP gas demand estimate, then, was not 
tempered by any conception of demand or supply 
price elasticity. Our assumption is that any price 
increase, either in gas itself via complete or partial 
deregulation or in other substitute fuels, will 
dampen demand. This is an integral part of the 
M.l.T. Energy Lab econometric model (which we 
cite), which predicts an average field price in 1980 
of $.61 (in 1974 dollars). At this point, quantity 
supplied would equal quantity demanded through 
increased supplies and decreased usage.
In consideration of potential gas supply, it must 
be noted that the M.l.T. model is more optimistic 
concerning supply response to price than is the 
Department of the Interior forecast. In part, this
could be due to reliance on differing figures for 
potential physical supply of gas.
The third area for comparison of the two 
projections is that of interfuel competition. We use 
a currently projected price of SNG at slightly under 
$4 per thousand cubic feet (1974 price), which is 
supported by recent claims from utilities and the 
Project Independence Report.
In its comparison of SNG prices with other gas 
sources, NGPRP used a figure of $.91-$1.27 per 
thousand cubic feet (1972 dollars) from the U.S. 
Bureau of Mines. This figure was used to 
demonstrate SNG's supposed competitiveness with 
other sources of gaseous fuel. Substitution away 
from gas to nongaseous fuels was not considered. 
Thus, the demand for gas (from all sources) was 
considered perfectly inelastic with respect to price. 
We specifically consider the switchovers, such as to 
electricity (in home use) and to direct coal burning 
(in industrial use), that would occur at higher gas 
prices and conclude that gasifying coal would not 
be competitive in any market except, perhaps, at 
heavily subsidized prices. □
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